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INTRODUCTION
Our planet is beset with a cancer which threatens our very
existence and which will not respond to the kind of treatment
that has been prescribed in the past. The cancer of water pol-
lution was engendered by our abuse of our lakes, streams,
rivers, and oceans; it ha thrived on our half-hearted at-
tempts to control it; and like any other disease, it can kill us.
Edmund S. Muskier
The first national "prescription" for water pollution was the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 (FWPCA). 2 Unfortunately, the
Act proved inadequate and was amended five times between 1956 and
1970,2 but the amendments failed to develop a comprehensive scheme
1 118 Cong. Rec. 516869 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972),
2 Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
8 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as amended,
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat. 498; Federal Water
672
THE WATER POLLUTION AMENDMENTS OP 1972
to reduce and eliminate water pollution' The failure of even the 1970
Amendments to make the FWPCA effective necessitated the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (1972 Amend-
ments).' The 1972 Amendments have been characterized as "totally
restructuring the water pollution control program and making a far-
reaching national commitment to clean water.
This comment will attempt to illustrate the manner in which the
1972 Amendments have restructured the water pollution control pro-
gram and discuss the extent to which they will effectuate the reduction
and elimination of water pollution. After a brief survey of the in-
adequacies of prior legislation and the goals of the 1972 Amendments,
attention will be focused on three specific elements of the present water
pollution control program. The first element discussed, which from a
technological viewpoint is the most important, is the program for the
construction of waste treatment facilities. The second and third ele-
ments to be considered, the establishment of standards and the enforce-
ment of those standards, will be examined on both the federal and
state levels. Finally, the coordination of state and federal programs
under the 1972 Amendments will be surveyed in detail. It is hoped
that this comment will demonstrate the proposition that an effective
water pollution control program requires an efficient and workable
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204; Water
Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903; Clean Water Restoration Act
of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246; Water Quality improvement Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91. [The Act, together with the amendments through 1970,
will hereinafter be cited as 33 U.S.C. §§ — (1970).]
4
 See generally Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legisla-
tion, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1103 (1970).
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq.
(Stipp. 1973) with minor exceptions) [hereinafter cited as 33 U.S.C.A. §§ — (Supp.
1973)].
0
 118 Cong. Rec. H2481 (daily ed. March 27, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Blatnik).
Despite the fact that the 1972 Amendments have totally restructured the water pollu-
tion control laws, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
recently decided that the 1972 Amendments do not provide exclusive remedies under
which the federal government may act to secure the abatement of water pollution. United
States v. United States Steel Corp., — F. Supp. —, 5 E.R.C. 1125 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The
court found that a cause of action had been stated under the federal common law of
nuisance. Id. at 1126. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); see generally
Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 767 (1973). The court also found that the 1972
Amendments did not preclude the Government from bringing suit under the Refuse Act
because the case at bar was commenced prior to the enactment of the Amendments and
the Amendments specifically saved actions commenced before it was enacted. 33 U.S.C.A.
1251 note (Supp. 1973). 5 E.R.C. at 1126. The court went on to say that, In any
event, the 1972 Amendments did not preclude actions for abatement under the Refuse
Act. It would appear that an action may be maintained under the Refuse Act if no
permit has been obtained. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1371(a) (2)(B) (Supp. 1973). If, however,
an NPDES permit has been obtained under * 402, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (Supp. 1973), such
permit will fulfill the requirements of the Refuse Act. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(a) (4) (Supp.
1973).
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interrelationship among the three elements on both state and federal
levels.
I. THE NEED FOR NEW LEGISLATION
A. The Inadequacies of Prior Law
Although the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as amended
through 1970 (1970 Act) contained provisions for the construction of
waste treatment facilities, 7 the setting of water quality standards,' and
procedures for the abatement of water pollution,' these provisions
were neither individually strong enough nor sufficiently interrelated to
reduce pollution effectively. For example, under the 1970 Act the first
element of the pollution control program, the construction of waste
treatment facilities, was basically independent of the second element,
the enforcement of pollution control standards. Section 8 of the 1970
Act" provided for federal grants of up to fifty-five percent of the total
cost of construction of sewage and waste treatment facilities by local
governments." Although section 8 required that the waste treatment
works be constructed in accordance with a state plan if they were to be
eligible for a federal grant," the required elements of those plans were
minimal. The 1970 Act did not impose a clearly defined level of tech-
nology to be applied by waste treatment works; the treatment facility
merely had to meet the vague requirement that it be "efficient."'
Another significant problem arose since, of the three available
pollution control standards, water quality standards," anti-degradation
standards,' and effluent limitations," the 1970 Act utilized only water
quality standards.17 The utilization of water quality standards alone
could not be effectively coordinated with enforcement procedures and
7 33 U.S.C. 1158 (1970).
33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (1970).
9 33 U.S.C. §§ 1160(d)-(g) (1970).
10 33 U.S.C. § 1158 (1970).
11 33 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b), (1) (1970).
12 33 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(5) (1970). Section 7 required that state water pollution
control programs be approved by the EPA in order to qualify the state for federal grants.
33 U.S.C: §§ 1157(f), (g) (1970).
18 33 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(4) (1970).
14 "Water quality standards" are quantitative measurements of the concentration of
pollutants in a particular body of water. The implementation of water quality standards
in effect prohibits any activity which would result in a greater concentration of pollutants
in the water than the maximum amount by statute or regulation.
15 "Anti-degradation," in the context of water quality, prohibits discharges into a
body of water which would increase the concentration of pollutants in that body of
water, regardless of the fact that the discharge would not result in a violation of applic-
able water quality standards.
16 "Effluent limitations" are quantitative measurements of the pollutants present in a
discharge. Effluent limitations prohibit discharges of pollutants in a greater concentration
or volume than permitted by statute or regulation and may be adjusted up or down to
achieve the desired water quality level.
17 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (1970).
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proved ineffective. While abatement actions could be initiated after
water quality standards had been violated, there were difficulties in
pinpointing the source of pollution when several sources were dis-
charging identical pollutants into the same body of water." Attempt-
ing to trace pollutants back to their point source" is very difficult since
shifting tides and currents disperse the pollutants throughout the body
of water." Abatement was possible only where the discharge resulted
in the lowering of water quality below the applicable standards21 or
where the health and welfare of affected persons was endangered. 22 As
a result of these limitations, it was often impossible to implement
abatement procedures until a serious water pollution problem had al-
ready developed. Moreover, the federal government could act inde-
pendently of other levels of government only with respect to interstate
waters and only when the waters of a state other than the state of dis-
charge were affected;" pollution of intrastate navigable waters was
subject to abatement by the federal government only with consent of
the governor of the state where the pollution originated." The lack of
effective federal abatement procedures, in concert with the absence
of a mandate to the states to abate water pollution effectively, rendered
the 1970 Act inefficient in many respects.
In an attempt to remedy the deficiencies of the 1970 Act, the
federal government resurrected the almost forgotten Refuse Act of
1899 22
 and sought to prohibit the discharge of any pollutants without
a permit." The Refuse Act provided that:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit . . . any
refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than
that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in
a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States,
or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the
same shall float or be washed into such navigable water . • . .27
This prohibition was limited by a proviso allowing the Secretary of
the Army to "permit the deposit of any material above mentioned in
the navigable waters . . . . ))28
18
 Hearings on S. 3687, S. 3468, S. 3470, S. 3471, S. 3472, S. 3181, S. 3484, S. 3500,
S. 3507, S. 3614, S. 3688, and S. 3697 Before the Subcomm, on Air and Water Pollution
of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 625 (1970).
10 The term "point source" is defined 0.9 any "discernable, defined and discrete
conveyance ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14)
(Supp. 1973).
20 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 625.
21 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (5) (1970).
22 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g) (1970).
2° 33 U.S.C. § 1160(0(5), (g)( 1 ) (1970).
24 33 U.S.C. §§ 1160(c) (5), (g)(2) (1970).
23 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
20 Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. 986 (1970).
27 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
20 Id.
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Notwithstanding the breadth of the language of the Refuse Act,
it is doubtful whether Congress intended, in 1899, to prohibit pollution
of the kind that is causing our present problems." Nevertheless, the
United States Supreme Court found that " 'refuse' includes all foreign
substances and pollutants apart from those 'flowing from streets and
sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state' into the water course.""
This interpretation allowed broad use of the Refuse Act, which is
applicable to all navigable waters and their tributaries, and greatly
expanded the scope of federal regulation of water pollution, since it
brought under federal regulation totally intrastate waters.
The Refuse Act is not without its limitations, however. Refuse
"flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid
state" into any navigable waters or their tributaries is exempt from its
provisions.31
 Thus municipal sewage, the second major source of water
pollution," is totally exempt from regulation under the Refuse Act. A
second deficiency of the Refuse Act lies in the fact that the grant of
power to the Secretary of the Army to issue permits for the discharge
of refuse is limited to discharges into navigable waters only, while the
Act prohibits discharges into both navigable waters and their non-
navigable tributaries. On the basis of this statutory distinction, the
Army Corps of Engineers Regulations" providing for permits to dis-
charge pollutants into non-navigable waterways were held invalid by
the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia in Kalur v.
Resor." Kalur undermined the value of the permit system contained
in the Refuse Act by limiting the scope of the system to navigable
waters, even though the Act itself absolutely prohibited discharges
into non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters. Industries situated
on non-navigable waterways, and therefore unable to obtain a permit
after Kalur were faced with a dilemma: they were required either to
eliminate discharges totally or to cease business operations in order to
comply with the statutory proscriptions.
The failure of the 1970 Act and the Refuse Act of 1899 to reduce
water pollution significantly led to the major revision of water pollu-
tion abatement statutes in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972." The 1972 Amendments totally replaced the
1970 Act, centralizing control of the federal water pollution control
effort in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), integrating the
29 See Note, The Refuse Act: Its Role Within the Scheme of Federal Water
Quality Legislation, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 304, 306 n.21 (1971).
30
 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966) (conviction for
accidental discharge of gasoline into river upheld).
31
 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
82 2 Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Annual Report, The
Cost of Clean Water, S. Doc. No, 23, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1971).
88 33 C.F.R. § 209.131 (1972).
84 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
85
 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq.
(Supp. 1973) with minor exceptions).
676
THE WATER POLLUTION AMENDMENTS OF 1972
permit system with a comprehensive water pollution control program,
and providing definite goals, clear standards and strong enforcement
procedures.
B. The Goals and Major Programs of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972
The 1970 Act declared the national water pollution control policy
to be the "prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution.""
The 1972 Amendments, on the other hand, declare that "it is the na-
tional goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters
be eliminated by 1985, . • ."" and ,set an interim goal which would
require a level of water quality that "provides for the protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation
in and on the water . . . by July 1, 1983 . ." 3
Thus the new national goal is the elimination of discharge of pollu-
tants into navigable waters. Under the 1972 Amendments, "navigable
waters" is defined as "the waters of the United States . . . ."" This
definition is intended to give the term "navigable waters . . . the
broadest possible constitutional interpretation.' 4° The precise delinea-
tion of the scope of this statutory definition has, however, been left for
the courts. If the traditional restrictive definition of "navigable
waters'''.
 is applied, the 1972 Amendments could be rendered in-
effective, as their scope would be more restricted than that of the
Refuse Act which encompassed both navigable waters and their
tributaries. It is submitted that the definition of "navigable waters"
supplied by Congress can and should be interpreted to include vir-
tually all waters geographically within the United States. This inter-
pretation can be constitutionally upheld if the discharge of pollutants
into the waters has a nexus to interstate commerce. In recent years, the
Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the scope of the commerce
clause where Congress has utilized it as the basis for legislation seeking
to solve national problems." Accordingly, it should not be necessary to
determine whether interstate commerce is affected by every pollutant
discharge in order to uphold the proposed interpretation of the 1972
Be 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
87 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp, 1973) (emphasis added).
88 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(2) (Supp, 1973).
89 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(7) (Supp. 1973).
40 S. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1972) thereinafter cited as Conference
Report].
41 Traditionally "navigable waters" have been defined as those waters which are
"navigable in fact," The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (I0 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870), or those waters
which could be made navigable by reasonable improvements, United States v. Appalachian
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-08 (1940).
42 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that Congress could, through the com-
merce clause, prohibit private restaurant owners from discriminating against customers on
the basis of race).
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Amendments' definition of navigable waters; if Congress is found to
have had a rational basis for finding that a regulated activity has a
relationship to interstate commerce, the Court's examination of the
question ends." It is submitted that Congress has determined that a
rational basis exists for finding that water pollution in any body of
water has a substantial effect on interstate commerce and, accordingly,
has determined that such pollution is subject to federal regulation.
The 1972 Amendments institute a well-defined two-phase program
to achieve their broad goals. Phase I requires that by July 1, 1977,
all point sources other than publicly owned treatment works must
utilize the "best practicable control technology."" Publicly owned
treatment works must, by the same date, meet standards of secondary
treatment, which will be promulgated by the Administrator of the
EPA." Phase II requires that by July 1, 1983, all point sources other
than publicly owned treatment works apply the "best available tech-
nology" or—should the EPA find it possible to do so—totally eliminate
the discharge of all pollutants." Publicly owned treatment facilities
shall by that date apply the best practicable control technology.'
The goals created in Phases I and II of the 1972 Amendments did
not meet with universal approval." The House version of the 1972
Amendments had conditioned the implementation of Phase II standards
on further congressional action to be taken after Congress had studied
the economic feasibility of implementing a "best available technology"
standard." The purpose of this provision was to enable Congress to
"make a decision on the [1983] requirement with the facts at hand
rather than with guess and conjecture as a basis.' Strong opposition
43 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1940).
44 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1973).
45 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1973). Section 304(d)(1) of the 1972
Amendments directs the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate guidelines determining
the effluent limitations available through secondary treatment. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(d)(1)
(Supp. 1973).
43 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(2) (A) (Supp. 1973).
47 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1973).
48 Russel Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, before the
House Committee on Public Works offered the view that zero discharge of pollutants
was a technological goal which may not have any relationship to water quality; it may
be very costly when compared with its benefits. 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs.
943 (Dec. 10, 1971). Eugene Jensen, Deputy Assistant administrator for water quality
programs, has expressed the opinion that a zero discharge goal is "somewhat divorced
from economics." 3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 359 (July 28, 1972). For an
example of industry's viewpoint see a letter from Monsanto Co. to Rep. Edward Boland,
118 Cong. Rec. H2522 (daily ed. March 27, 1972).
48 H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 315(a) (1971); id, § 301(b)(2); see also 118
Cong. Rec. H2483 (daily ed. March 27, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Harsha).
50 118 Cong. Rec. 112483 (daily ed. March 27, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Harsha); see
also id. at 112505 (remarks of Rep. Johnson). During the debates on adoption of the
1972 Amendments the following exchange occurred on the Senate floor:
Mr. Pearson: The other question I wish to ask the Senator is whether some
estimate or judgment has been made as to the cost of achieving zero pollution
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to the required study was presented on the floor of the House" and
the provision was deleted by the Conference Committee." It was
pointed out that although there is some merit to the argument that the
cost of abating water pollution should be studied before goals are set,"
sufficient flexibility is built into the procedure for setting effluent limita-
tions to take into account costs in resources that will become apparent
only in the future." This flexibility is achieved because the levels of
technology applicable to effluent limitations under section 301" are to
be determined only after consideration of economic costs and other en-
vironmental factors."
The federal water pollution control program enacted in the 1972
Amendments consists of four major elements. The first is a series of
research programs provided for primarily in Title I." Many of these
research programs are similar to FWPCA (1970) programs, but others
were newly created to develop information and technology applicable
to more recently recognized problems of water pollution control. These
provisions primarily entail appropriations and ministerial duties and
will not be discussed in this comment. It should be noted, however, that
these federally funded research programs are intended to have a direct
effect on the "best available technology" requirement of Phase II.
Title II of the 1972 Amendments" contains the major provisions
of the Act relating to the second element of the water pollution control
program, the construction of treatment facilities. The third and fourth
elements of the program, which establish adequate standards and pro-
vide for effective enforcement of these standards, are found primarily
by 1985, both as to capital cost and operative cost.
Mr. Muskie: There are no estimates of that kind that, in my judgment, have any
validity
117 Cong. Rec. 517421 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971). Russel Train, Chairman of the Council
on Environmental Quality, has been quoted as estimating the removal of 95 to 99% of
pollution from municipal and industrial sources to require a capital cost of $35.3 billion.
He further estimated the total cost of 100% elimination of municipal and industrial pollu-
tion by 1981 to be $94.5 billion. Id. at 517400 (remarks of Sen. Muskie) ; see also 118
Cong. Rec. 112513 (daily ed. March 27, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Cleveland).
51 For debates on an amendment offered to delete the requirement, see 118 Cong.
Rec. 112509-16 (daily ed. March 28, 1972). Although the condition for implementation of
the 1983 goals has been eliminated, the national study has not been deleted. 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1325 (Supp. 1973). Rep. Guide commented that if the provision were not deleted:
the polluters of the Nation will be on notice that Congress has failed to bite the
bullet and write a water pollution law that will bring results within the fore-
seeable future. These polluters will be on notice that delay, and obfuscation are
still available to them as they use our nations waterways as open sewers.
118 Cong. Rec. 112613 (daily ed. March 28, 1972).
52 Conference Report, supra note 40, at 120-21.
58 See 118 Cong. Rec. H2507 (daily ed. March 27, 1912) (remarks of Rep. Miller).
54 Id. at 112609 (daily ed. March 28, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Reuss).
55 33 U.S.C.A. * 1311 (Supp. 1973).
55 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(b) (Supp. 1973).
57 33 U.S.C.A. {§ 1251-65 (Supp. 1973).
" 33 U.S.C.A. § 1281-92 (Supp. 1973).
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in Titles III" and IV."' Although these statutory provisions are far
stronger and more workable than the provisions of the 1970 Act, they
are basically a framework for the development of administrative regu-
lations and their vitality is dependent upon the effectiveness of the
regulations promulgated under their aegis. The remainder of this com-
ment will examine these latter three elements of the pollution control
program and their relationship to each other.
II. THE CONSTRUCTION OF POLLUTION' CONTROL FACILITIES
An essential foundation for any water pollution control program
is a coordinated and extensive effort to construct water pollution con-
trol facilities. When the 1972 Amendments were before Congress, a
major issue arose concerning projected construction costs of needed
facilities and the proportion of those costs which would be paid by
the federal grants. The Nixon Administration had concluded that pro-
jected needs through 1974 for municipal waste treatment works would
be $12.56 billion, of which $6.17 billion should come from federal
grants." Members of Congress, however, made higher estimates of the
needs," and Congress, in the 1972 Amendments, authorized $18 billion
in federal funding for municipal treatment project grants through fiscal
1975.63
Notwithstanding the larger grant authorized by Congress, the
Nixon Administration has announced that it will not appropriate the
entire authorized amount." The effect of this limitation on appropria-
66 33 U.S.C.A. El 1311-28 (Supp. 1973).
Go 33 U.S.C.A. $1 1341-45 (Supp. 1973).
61 Hearings on S. 75, S. 192, S. 280, S. 281, S. 523, S. 573, S. 601, S. 679, S. 927,
S.1011, S. 1012, S. 1013, S. 1014, S. 1015, and S. 1017 Before the Subcomm, on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 22 (1971)
(testimony of William Ruckelshaus) [hereinafter dted as 1971 Senate Hearings].
62 S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report].
68 33 U.S.C.A. 1287 (Supp. 1973). The precise breakdown is $5, $6 and $7 billions
for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1973, 1974 and 1975 respectively. Id. In light of the
fact that the Administration had advocated only $6 billion for federal grants, President
Nixon vetoed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 on Oct. 17,
1972, 8 Weekly Comp. of Presidential Doc. 1531 (Oct. 23, 1972). On Oct. 18, 1972, S.
2770 was enacted into law over the President's veto by an overwhelming margin in both
the House, 118 Cong. Rec. H10272 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972), and the Senate, id. at
S18554 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972).
64 On Nov. 28, 1972 William Ruckelshaus, Administrator of the EPA, announced
that the President had directed him to allocate no more than $2 billion for fiscal 1973
and $3 billion for fiscal 1974 of the $11 billion authorized for federal grants for those
years. 3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 879 (Dec. I, 1972).
The City of New York has filed an action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia alleging that the withholding of the authorized funds by the
President is unconstitutional. Id. at 937 (Dec. 15, 1972). Although the action would
appear to be, as Senator Muskie and Representative 131atnik labeled, it, a "flagrant dis-
regard of the intent of Congress," id. at 905 (Dec. 8, 1972), the constitutional question
has not been adjudicated.
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tions is unclear although the Administration claims that in reality it
will not set the program back more than twelve months." Complica-
tions arise, however, from the probability that many industrial polluters
may have desired to tie into municipal treatment works, the construc-
tion of which is now delayed, rather than construct their own facilities.
This could mean, in effect, that marginal industrial plants, expecting
to utilize public treatment works rather than construct their own facil-
ities, may be faced with the prospect either of making unfeasible capital
expenditures or of ceasing business operations if they cannot satisfy
the applicable effluent limitation standards." Should a considerable
number of these marginal operations be forced to close, the adverse ef-
fect on employment and the market involved could be serious.
A. Grants for the Construction of Public Treatment Works
Under the 1972 Amendments the conceptual framework for fed-
eral grant funding of public treatment facilities has been radically
altered and the grant programs more tightly integrated with standard-
setting and enforcement provisions than under the 1970 Act." The
new funding system is essentially composed of three programs: direct
federal grants to states and localities; a mechanism by which states
and localities can more readily market their own bond issues for pur-
poses of treatment facilities; and a system of capital and user charges
aimed at sustaining the facilities after construction.
The first changes involve the allocation and distribution of funds.
The 1970 Act provided a maximum grant of thirty percent of the cost
of treatment works, which could be raised to fifty percent if the level
of state funding to all projects within the state and the state water qual-
ity standards met minimum requirements established in the Act.° 8
 The
federal share could be further increased under the 1970 Act to fifty-
five percent if the project was part of a comprehensive metropolitan
plan.°° The 1972 Amendments, in contrast, provide for a maximum
federal share of seventy-five percent of the construction costs of the
project." The increased federal share should enable a greater number
66 3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs, 879 (Dec. 1, 1972) (citing statement of William
Ruckelshaus).
69 Id. at 940 (Dec. 15, 1972).
07 See generally 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1281-92 (Supp. 1973). The funding of local treat-
ment works was formerly regulated under § 8 of the 1970 Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1158 (1970).
08 33 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b) (2), (6), (7) (1970).
69 33 U.S.C. § 1158(f) (1970).
To 33 U.S.C.A. § 1282(a) (Supp. 1973). The bill passed by the Senate provided for
a 60% federal share, to be increased to 70% if the state agreed to pay 10% of the cost
of all treatment works for which grants were made in the state for any given years. S.
2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a) (1971). The House version as passed raised the in-
cremental percentage to 15%, for a maximum federal share of 75%. H.R. 11896, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a) (1971), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. H2780 (daily ed. March 29,
1972). The final version of § 202 was substituted by the Conference Committee. Con-
ference Report, supra note 40, at 110. The term "construction" is defined in § 212 of the
1972 Amendments. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1292(1) (Supp. 1973). This definition is essentially the
same as the definition in § 8(e) of the 1970 Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1158(e) (1970).
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of cities and towns to construct treatment facilities."
Another significant change in the grant program lies in the nature
of the grant itself. Under the 1970 Act, grants were made from annual
congressional appropriations; a grant for a portion of the project cost
in the first year did not constitute a congressional obligation to continue
grants each year until completion of the project." The difficulties pre-
sented by this system were summarized by Secretary of the Interior
Walter Hickel:
The lag between Federal authorizations and appropriations
in the present legislation [FWPCA 1969] in the past has
caused confusion and uncertainty among the States and com-
munities.
As they were uncertain about the level of Federal funds
to be available on [sic] any given year, they could not ade-
quately plan and finance their construction activities.
Assured funding is a key component of the proposed
legislation—it will enable the Federal Government to enter
"grant agreements" with municipalities . . . ."
Since many communities are required by state law to underwrite an
entire project at the time the bids are accepted, those communities may
have been reluctant to begin projects, even with assurances of federal
grants, unless funds were guaranteed or received in full." Concerned
local governmental agencies, therefore, supported amending the grant
program to ensure that federal grants would represent long-term con-
tractual obligations."
Congress responded to this problem by providing in the 1972
Amendments that approval by the EPA of plans, specifications and
estimates for the construction of treatment works will constitute con-
tractual obligations." When the amount of the federal grant for a par-
71 118 Cong, Rec. H2484 (daily ed. March 27, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Jones).
72 33 U.S.C. { 1158(c) (1970).
73 Hearings on S. 3687, S. 3468, S. 3470, S. 3471, S. 3472, S. 3181, S. 3484, S. 3500,
S. 3507, S. 3614, S. 3688, and S. 3697 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution
of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 249-50 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as 1970 Senate Hearings]. Although this testimony was given in the hearings pre-
ceding the enactment of the 1970 Amendments to the FWPCA, the suggestion was not
incorporated into that legislation.
74 117 Cong. Rec. S17445-47 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971) (remarks of Senators Muskie,
Hart and Randolph).
75 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 516, 1480; see letter from Mayor Gibbs of
Detroit, Mich., at 117 Cong., Rec. 517446 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971).
70 33 U.S.C.A. § 1283(a) (Supp. 1973). Section 205(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1285(b)
(Supp. 1973), provides that any funds allotted to a state under § 205(a), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1285(a) (Supp. 1973), shall remain available for contractual obligation under § 203(a),
.33 U.S.C.A. § 1283(a) (Supp. 1973), from the date of appropriation until one year after
the close of the fiscal year for which they were authorized.
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titular project is determined, the entire amount of the grant will be
earmarked from funds appropriated in the year of the approval of the
project. The funds will then be paid out over several years, as the con-
struction of the project progresses." Under this system states and
localities will be able to enter into multi-year construction contracts
with the assurance of sufficiently long-term federal assistance.
To assure the success of the federal grant program, state and local
governments must be able to raise the difference between the total cost
of the public treatment project and the amount of the federal grant.
This sum will be at least twenty-five percent of the cost and will in-
crease if the federal grant is for less than seventy-five percent of the
total cost of the project. Raising this amount may not often present
significant difficulties, but where the amount of interest payable on a
municipal bond issue is limited by state law," municipalities attempt-
ing to raise their share of the cost may encounter problems marketing
a competitive bond issue.
A proposal made in 1970 to set up a Federal Environmental Fi-
nancing Authority to purchase the obligations of local governments
was not enacted into law at that time," but was reintroduced in the
Ninety Second Congress as a section of the 1972 Amendments and
enacted as the Environmental Financing Act of 1972 (EFA)." The
purpose of the EFA is to assure that no locality should be unable to
construct treatment works because it cannot market bonds; the Au-
thority is empowered to purchase any obligations issued by a local
body to finance its share of the construction costs of any waste treat-
ment facility eligible for a federal grant where such obligations cannot
be privately marketed. 81
TT The average time necessary to construct a municipal waste treatment facility prior
to the passage of the 1972 Amendments was 42 months. It is estimated by the EPA that
the new requirements of the Act will increase that time to 48 months, 3 BNA Env. Rep.,
Current Devs. 855 (Nov. 24, 1972). Thus under the prior law a project would not be
absolutely guaranteed of funding for the entire proportion of the cost for which federal
grants were available. It would require at least three separate annual appropriations to
pay the federal share in full. Under the 1972 Amendments the federal government is
obligated for the entire sum at the time the plans and estimates of the project are ap-
proved. Of course, failure by the state to maintain the prerequisites for receipt of the
grant would constitute a breach of contract for which the Administrator may rescind.
See Senate Report, supra note 62, at 27. Funds thus authorized and appropriated in one
year will then be expended over several successive years in the future. This may point
out a weakness in President Nixon's rationale for vetoing the bill and his subsequent
limitation on appropriations, see text at notes 61-65 supra, since the actual disbursement
of the $18 billion would not be over the three years ending June 1975 but would extend
until approximately 1980.
78 See, e.g., Ark. Const. amend. No. 13, amending art. 16, § 1; Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 215.685 (1971); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 288.510 (1971).
70 S. 3468, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),
80 Environmental Financing Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 12 (Oct. 18, 1972)
(codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Supp. 1973), amending 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970); 31 U.S.C.A.
711 (Supp. 1973), amending 31 U.S.C. § 711 (1970); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1281 note (Supp.
1973)).
81 33 U.S.C.A. § 1281 note (Supp. 1973). Although the EFA will not be competing
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These provisions, however, will not assist all municipalities in ob-
taining credit. Municipalities unable to issue bonds because of a statu-
tory debt ceiling will be unable to obtain credit through the EFA. 82
Similarly, where local bodies have been unable to borrow because of
interest rate ceilings, the EFA rate, which must take into considera-
tion the market interest rates on municipal bonds,83 may also be above
that ceiling!" Given these considerations, the EFA may not be a totally
adequate substitute for larger federal grants, but it should encourage
increased flotation of municipal bonds directed toward construction of
waste treatment facilities.
The last major change in the funding of waste treatment works
enacted by the 1972 Amendments is provision for a system of "user
charges" designed to assure the continuing availability of operating
funds for any plant built with a federal grant. Section 204 (b) of the
1972 Amendments provides that no grant shall be approved unless
the applicant has adopted a system by which each user will pay its
proportional share of the operating and maintenance costs of the
facility.85 Furthermore, each industrial user is required to repay its
proportional share of the capital costs represented by the federal
grant." The grantee will retain that portion of capital charges col-
lected from industrial users that is equal to the amount of the cost
paid by the local governmental body plus any additional amount neces-
sary to assure future expansion and modification, the total not to
exceed fifty percent of the revenues derived from operation of the
treatment facility."
These capital and user charges employed by the 1972 Amend-
ments impose the economic costs of the disposal of pollutants on indus-
trial users of public treatment works. Non-industrial users must pay
against private underwriters in the municipal bond market, Conference Report, supra
note 40, at 155, the Act was vigorously opposed by private underwriters. 1970 Senate
Hearings, supra note 73, at 1227-55; 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 804-45;
Hearings on Water Pollution Control Legislation Before the House Comm. on Public
Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 620-54 (1971). Before the Authority can purchase any obliga-
tions, the Administrator of the EPA must certify that the local body has been "unable to
obtain on reasonable terms sufficient credit to finance its actual needs." 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1281 note (Supp. 1973). The Authority will operate at a loss because it will be lending
money to municipalities at a rate below that at which its own obligations are being
marketed. This deficit will be made up by payments from the Treasury to the Authority.
Id. It is expected, however, that the deficit will be offset by the tax receipts from the
interest earned on the bonds issued by the Authority. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note
73, at 1613. Section 512(j) of the Act provides that any bonds issued under the Act
shall be subject to taxes on both interest and principal to the same extent as like bonds
issued by a private corporation. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1281 note (Supp. 1973).
82 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 1616; 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note
61, at 825.
sa 33 U.S.C.A. § 1281 note (Supp. 1973).
84 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 1616; 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note
61, at 825.
85 33 U.S.C.A. § 1284(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1973).
55 33 U.S.C.A. § 1284(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1973).
87 33 U.S.C.A. f 1284(b) (3) (Supp. 1973).
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a use charge that in many cases will not reflect the true economic cost
of pollution treatment because non-industrial users do not directly pay
the capital costs of the project; that is, although the tax dollars of
non-industrial users will eventually pay the capital costs not recovered
from industrial users, under the tax system the costs will be appor-
tioned other than by the mechanism of the marketplace." In some
cases, however, the user charge can be apportioned to represent true
economic cost to the degree that a user can be specifically identified
(e.g., a specific factory, town, or sewage district) and can be designed
to make the cost of abatement a normal cost of the polluter.
B. Funding Private Waste Treatment Facilities
The 1972 Amendments have made virtually no provision for the
funding of private waste treatment projects." The sole provision of
the 1972 Amendments that Congress directed toward funding private
construction was an amendment to the Small Business Act" that pro-
vides for Small Business Administration loans to small business to
"meet water pollution control requirements established . . . [by the
88
 The fact that the capital charge was imposed only upon industrial users of public
treatment works and not uniformly on all users evoked considerable controversy. The
National Association of Manufacturers criticized the capital charge provisions on the
ground that they would ignore industry's contributions to taxes and its role in stimulating
the economy. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 1445. An amendment was offered
on the floor of the House which would have deleted the capital charge provisions. 118
Cong. Rec. 1126628 (daily ed. March 28, 1972). The amendment's sponsor, Rep. Mc-
Donald, predicted that imposition of the capital charge would cause industry not to
participate in public waste treatment systems, and as a result, the user charges which
would be assessed against those who did use the system would be higher than if industry
were paying a sigfinificant portion of those charges. 118 Cong. Rec H2628 (daily ed.
March 28, 1972). The principal argument for retention of the capital charge was that it
would be "fundamentally wrong for the federal government to fund treatment works for
private industry." 118 Cong. Rec. 112630 (daily ed. March 28, 1972) (remarks of Rep.
Roe); Senate Report, supra note 62, at 29.
It is submitted that the undesirable results of the capital charge will not materialize
as predicted. The economic alternatives will result in businPqqe4 choosing to tie into the
public treatment works. There are three principal reasons that will dictate this choice:
(1) The industrial user would have to pay only his proportional share of the capital
cost rather than 100% plus interest. 118 Cong. Rec. H2632 (daily ed. March 28, 1972)
(remarks of Rep. Grover).
(2) There are economies of scale in the operation of large public treatment works
which result in lower maintainence cost to industrial users through the use charge than
would exist if they chose to maintain their own complete facilities. Id.
(3) An industry discharging into a public treatment facility need only meet the
pre-treatment standards of § 307, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317 (Supp. 1973), rather than the
more rigid effluent limitations of § 301 and § 306, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311, 1316 (Supp. 1973).
88
 A limited federal subsidy to industrial users of public treatment works is provided
to the extent that the capital charge imposed on the industrial users does not bear any
interest.
90 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
* 8 (Oct. 18, 1972), amending 15 U.S.C. ft 633, 636 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
ft 633(c), 636(g) (Supp. 1973)).
685
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
FWPCA if the business would] suffer substantial economic injury
without assistance .. 2 1"
Representative Heinz proposed creation of a grant program for
private industrial facilities funded through an excise tax on the dis-
charge of pollutants." The proposed amendment would have required
that a "charge," in effect an excise tax, be levied on the discharge of
pollutants based on the character and quantity of the discharge. All
receipts from these charges would be deposited in a trust fund by the
Secretary of the Treasury and would be available for funding state
pollution control programs or for grants for public treatment works."
The availability of the funds for these purposes was limited, however,
by a provision requiring that any point source subsequently installing
or improving pollution control facilities would receive a fifty percent
rebate on all charges previously paid, not to exceed one hundred per-
cent of the cost of the pollution control facility. This amendment,
then, would have provided federal funding of private construction of
waste treatment facilities only from tax receipts identifiable as pre-
viously collected from the grantee.
The first element of the proposed amendment, the "charge" con-
cept, has generated substantial controversy. Opponents contend that
the charge, standing alone, would constitute, in effect, a mere license
to pollute,'" while proponents argue that the charge would provide an
incentive to abate and impose pollution costs on the polluter." These
cannot be considered in the abstract; the effects of the charge would
depend on the level at which the charge is set. If the charges were set
at a level at which abatement is more expensive than continuing to pay
the tax, a disincentive to abatement would result; if, on the other hand,
the charges were set at a level greater than the cost of abatement, a
positive incentive to abate would be effected.
The further provisions of the proposed amendment, earmarking
revenues collected through pollution charges for return to industrial
polluters constructing pollution control facilities, would have provided
an added incentive to early abatement. This further incentive would
be, however, somewhat limited by the fact that the funds available
for reimbursement would be restricted to an amount equal to what the
polluter had previously paid into the fund. Had the plan been modified
to make available to any point source that constructed control facilities
a grant from the fund equal to a percentage of the cost of those facil-
ities, it would have provided greater incentive to abate discharges
quickly. Such a plan would have exposed the fund to more rapid de-
91
 15 U.S.CA. 636(g) (Supp. 1973).
92
 118 Cong. Rec. H2719 (daily ed. March 29, 1972). The amendment was, how-
ever, never debated or voted upon because it was ruled out of order. Id. at H2721.
93
 In these provisions the Heinz Amendment was substantially similar to one pro-
posed in the Senate by Senator Proxmire. See 117 Cong. Rec S17425 (daily ed. Nov. 2,
1971).
04
 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 541, 584-85.
95
 117 Cong. Rec. S17426 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
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pletion, however, and could have been attacked as inequitable by those
polluters who were slow to construct control facilities.
III. FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS
An effective system for the elimination of water pollution contains
three basic elements: standards, preventive measures and remedial en-
forcement. Under pre-1972 law,, these elements were not effectively
coordinated on the federal level or effectively divided between the
federal and state governments. Although the 1970 Act provided for
standards" and remedial enforcement," there were no preventive
measures. While the Refuse Act of 1899 08 was partially preventive in
scope, as noted above, the strong points of the Refuse Act were limited
by judicial interpretation." Furthermore, the Refuse Act provided no
statutory basis for applying environmental quality standards under its
permit system.
The 1972 Amendments institute a system in which the EPA de-
termines the minimum water quality standards and effluent limitations
which the states will be required to enact, promulgates guidelines for
state standards, and has the power to reject inadequate standards pro-
posed by any state. Initially, the EPA will conduct a nation-wide
permit program but ultimately the states are expected to assume this
duty. The power of the federal government to act swiftly to secure
abatement of pollutant discharges is not subject to suspension when a
state program is approved, and will be used on a continuing basis in
appropriate cases.
A. Standards
Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the federal water pollution control
program suffered from the absence of a control standard which could
be readily applied to implement enforcement procedures. Violations
of water quality standards did not provide adequate means of identi-
fying offending polluters. The 1972 Amendments attempt to remedy this
deficiency by the utilization of a new type of standard: effluent limi-
tations which will be monitored at the source of the pollution.
1. The FWPCA Prior to 1972
Until 1965, the FWPCA did not provide for definite, administra-
tively set water quality standards expressed in terms of volume and
concentration of pollutants. Abatement actions could be brought only
after the alleged pollution had "endanger[ed] the health or welfare of
persons" affected. °° This vague standard encouraged widespread abuse,
gg 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (1970).
97 33 U.S.C. § 1160(d)-(h) (1970).
gg 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
gU See text at notes 165-70 infra.
100 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88,
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since industries were free to pollute relatively clean waters up to the
point where their pollutant discharge endangered "health or welfare."
Similarly, polluters could continue discharging into seriously degraded
waters; since such waters would be unused except for industrial dis-
charges, it would be difficult to find someone whose "health or welfare"
had been endangered by the pollution.101 The Water Quality Act of
1965 102 attempted to eliminate this anomaly by requiring that admin-
istratively determined water quality standards be set by each state for
all interstate waters within the state, subject to approval by the federal
government."' These water quality standards were to be set at a level
which would "protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality
of the water and . . . take into consideration their use and value for
public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational
purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other legitimate uses."'" If
any state failed to promulgate such standards and submit them for
federal approval, the federal government would promulgate standards
applicable for the state.'oa
Although the 1965 Act provided for administrative standards
clearly more workable than the standards of prior legislation, water
quality standards, without more, were generally inadequate to reduce
and eliminate water pollution. The utilization of water quality stan-
dards alone failed to resolve the problem of the source that could dis-
charge into a relatively clean stream without lowering its quality
below the applicable standard. Moreover, the danger existed that state
legislatures would tend to set water quality standards below the level
of existing water quality so as not to discourage industry from locating
within the state. However, the inadequacy of water quality standards as
the sole control mechanism is not solved merely by setting high stan-
dards. The major weakness in the utilization of water quality standards,
regardless of their level, is that no abatement action can be taken until
after the pollution has occurred in sufficient quantity to lower water
quality below the applicable standard. Furthermore, the use of water
quality standards alone does not permit effective enforcement since the
discharge of each individual point source is not constantly monitored.
Rather, once it is determined that the standard has been violated, the
administrators will experience difficulty in pinpointing the exact source
§ 7, 75 Stat. 208-09; Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat.
504, amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act ch. 758, § 2(d), 62 Stat. 1156
(1948) (codified and renumbered at 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (1970)).
101 See Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68
Mich. L. Rev, 1103, 1111 (1970).
102 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903, amending 33 U.S.C. § 466 (1964) (codified and
renumbered at 33 U.S.C. { 1160 (1970)).
103 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(1) (1970).
104 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(3) (1970).
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of a pollutant where several point sources are discharging into one
body of water.'"
These problems were not unrecognized, and limited attempts were
made to achieve administratively what Congress had failed to do
legislatively. In 1966 the Department of the Interior, having juris-
diction over the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, is-
sued guidelines for water quality standards required under the
FWPCA. Those guidelines required, as a prerequisite for EPA ap-
proval of any state standards, that such standards prohibit degradation
of interstate waters.'" Other guidelines required the best practicable
treatment of pollutants before discharge unless lesser treatment would
not impair the quality of the receiving waters.'" These requirements,
however, were effectively limited to interstate waters, as was the entire
1970 Act prior to the 1972 Amendments."'
Under the 1970 Act, state water quality standards were applicable
to federal permits issued under the Refuse Act. Section 21 of the 1970
Act required that any applicant for a federal discharge permit include
with his application a state certification that the activity would not
violate any applicable state standards.'" However, state certification
of compliance with water quality standards was mandatory only for
discharges into navigable interstate waters,'" and unless a state had
voluntarily adopted standards for intrastate waters, certification would
not be necessary for a discharge into navigable intrastate waters.'"
1 °5
 33 U.S.C. H 1160(c)(2), (4) (1970).
loa 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 715; 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note
62, at 625; see also Address of John Quarles, Jr., before ABA National Inst., 3 BNA
Env. Rep., Current Devs. 793, 794 (Nov. 3, 1972).
107
 Hearings on Activities of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration—
Water Quality Standards Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 659-60 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967
Senate Hearings].
108 Id. at 660.
100
 33 U.S.C. * 1160(c) (1) (1970). This definition did not include tributaries of
interstate waters. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 107, at 661. Discharges into
tributaries of interstate waters not themselves subject to the statute were subject to
abatement if the discharges caused the water quality of the interstate waters of which they
were tributaries to fall below the required standards, 33 U.S.C. * 1160(c) (5) (1970). It
would appear that discharges into tributaries, regardless of the effect on the water
quality of the tributary, were not subject to abatement if the effect on interstate waters
could not be sufficiently measured or traced.
110 33 U.S.C. § 1171(b)(1) (1970). Each state was required to provide procedures
for the application for and the granting of state certification. Id.
111 See 33 U.S.C. H 1160(c), 1171(b)(1) (1970).
112 Where there were no applicable standards state certification was unnecessary.
33 U.S.C. 1171(b)(9) (A) (1970). In 1971 the National Governors Conference com-
piled a report on state water pollution control programs at the request of the Subcom-
mittee on Air and Water Pollution. The report is published in 1971 Senate Hearings,
supra note 61, at 1448-79. All 47 states which responded bad adopted water quality
standards for interstate waters. Those that had not done so for intrastate waters re-
ported that they were in the process of doing so. Many of the states questioned the
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Thus, prior to 1972, water quality standards adopted for interstate
waters could not be implemented unless the waters were also navigable.
Conversely, the water quality standards to be applied to navigable
waters were not required to have been promulgated unless the waters
were also interstate waters.
2. The 1972 Amendments
The 1972 Amendments attempt to resolve the problems of prior
water pollution control measures by shifting the primary emphasis of
regulation from water quality standards to effluent limitations: "Under
this Act the basis of pollution prevention and elimination will be the
application of effluent limitations. Water quality will be a measure of
program effectiveness and performance, not a means of elimination and
enforcement." "a The Senate version of the 1972 Amendments contem-
plated an eventual abandonment of the use of water quality standards,'
but this was criticized by the Nixon Administration."' The final version
of the Act reflects this criticism and provides for the extensive use of
existing water quality standards."' Under the distribution of standard-
setting functions established by the 1972 Amendments, the federal
government prescribes the minimum acceptable effluent limitations"'
while the states, subject to EPA approval, are free to set water quality
standards based on local needs."'
The problems already encountered with state water quality standards
under prior law were not the only reasons for dissatisfaction with those
standards. Congress' primary reason for shifting the emphasis from
water quality standards to effluent limitations is that the present state
of technological knowledge is insufficient to determine adequately the
precise relationships between water quality and pollutant discharge."'
To overcome this obstacle, section 301 of the 1972 Act simply provides
that "the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlaw-
ful."120 As the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution pointed
out:
efficacy of effluent limitations. The responses indicated that when both interstate and
intrastate water standards had been adopted they were substantially similar. However,
only 27 states had federally approved standards for interstate waters. Senate Report,
supra note 62, at 4.
115 Id. at 8.
114 See S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301, 302 (1971).
115 Statement of William Ruckelshaus. 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 966, 967
(Dec. 10, 1971).
118 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1313, 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312 (Supp. 1973).
117 33 U.S.C.A. $ 1313(e)(3) (A) (Supp. 1973),
118 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1313(a), (b) (Supp. 1973). The exact opposite system was also
proposed: states should set the applicable effluent limitations and the federal government
should set minimum water quality standards. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at
736-38.
118 S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report].
1" 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (Supp. 1973).
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[t] his section clearly establishes that the discharge of pollu-
tants is unlawful. Unlike its predecessor program which per-
mitted the discharge of certain amounts of pollutants . . . ,
this legislation would clearly establish that no one has the
right to pollute—that pollution continues because of techno-
logical limits, not because of any inherent right to use the
nation's waterways for the purpose of disposing of wastes!'
However, as will be discussed later, this prohibition is subject to the
permit system established in section 402 122 of the 1972 Amendments.
The 1972 Amendments provide for the imposition of effluent lim-
itations in two phases, and apply separate standards for public waste
treatment facilities and nonpublic point sources. Phase I requires that
by July 1, 1977, all nonpublic point sources must meet effluent stan-
dards based on the "best practicable control technology presently
available.'" Publicly owned treatment works must meet effluent
limitations based on secondary treatment. 124 Phase II requires the
elimination of all pollutant discharges by July 1, 1983, unless such a
goal is not technologically or economically feasible for a specific cate-
gory or class of point sources, in which case the "best available tech-
nology economically achievable" will control effluent limitations!"
Phase II requires all publicly owned treatment works to meet those
effluent limitations which can be achieved by the application of the
"best practicable waste treatment technology" after alternative waste
treatment management techniques have been studied!" Effluent limita-
tions will be determined for categories and classes of point sources
rather than for individual point sources!"
121 Senate Report, supra note 119, at 42.
122 33	 §§ 1342-45 (Supp. 1973).
120 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1973). The Administrator must annually
publish regulations providing guidelines for effluent limitations available by the applica-
tion of the best practicable technology and the factors to be taken into account in de-
fining the best practicable control technology. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(b) (1) (Supp. 1973).
It is expected that the range of best practicable technology will be based on "the average
of the best existing performances by plants of various sizes, ages, and unit processes
within each industrial category." Senate Report, supra note 119, at 50. The Administra-
tor of the EPA has predicted that most industries will be able to meet these 1977 goals.
3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 855 (Nov. 24, 1972).
124 33 U.S.C.A.	 1311(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1973). Section 304(d)(1), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1314(d) (1) (Supp. 1973), directs the Administrator to define the effluent limitations
available by secondary treatment. The Administrator of the EPA predicted that munici-
pal treatment plants will not be able to meet this goal. 3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Dem
855 (Nov. 24, 1972).
125 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b) (2)(A) (Supp. 1973). The Administrator must promulgate
regulations identifying the effluent limitations achievable by the application of "best
available control technology" and the factors to be considered in defining such tech-
nology. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(b) (2) (Supp. 1973). The level of "best available technology"
will be based, at a minimum, on the technology achieved by the best performer in any
industrial category. Senate Report, supra note 119, at 50.
120 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1973); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1281(g)(2)(A)
(Supp. 1973).
127 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311(b) (2) (A), 1314(b) (Supp. 1973). These categories and
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During Phase I, the effluent limitations applicable to a category or
class may be made more stringent for any particular point source within
that category or class if any applicable water quality standards so re-
quire.' Hence, in a locality whose water quality is below the applicable
water quality standard, a polluter may be subject to stricter effluent
limitations than a similar polluter in a different locality. The compet-
itive disadvantage which an industrial polluter may suffer because of
its unfortunate location may be alleviated, however. Effluent limitations
may be eased for a particular point source if the revised limitations
represent the maximum use of available technology and will result in
reasonable progress toward the elimination of water pollution. 1 " Al-
though ardent environmentalists may oppose this exception, it is argu-
ably a necessary concession to economic reality. The broad scope of
the 1972 Amendments is intended to encompass virtually every pollu-
tion point source in the country; were it not for the exception, margin-
ally profitable enterprises unable to apply the requisite technology
would be forced to cease business operations, and the consequent elim-
ination of thousands of jobs might well be unacceptable in a society
with a high unemployment rate.
The application of water quality standards to effluent limitations
differs in Phase II from that in the prior phase. Phase I effluent limita-
tions must be revised upward to meet the clear and definite water
quality standards, expressed in terms of concentration and volume of
pollutants, imposed by section 303 (d) upon individual bodies of
water." Section 302, however, requires that during Phase II effluent
limitations will be made more stringent only where necessary for the
attainment or maintenance of that water quality in a specific
portion of the navigable waters which shall assure protection
of public water supplies, agricultural and industrial uses, and
the protection and propagation of a balanced population of
shellfish, fish, and wildlife, and allow recreational activities in
and on the water . . . . 131
These are vague criteria. It is true that the standards imposed during
Phase I by section 303 are based on the same criteria,' but they are
expressed in terms of precisely measurable requirements. In contrast,
classes may be further subdivided with separate requirements for each subdivision. One
such industry which has been broken dawn into subcategories is the pulp and paper
industry. 3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Days. 881 (Dec. 1, 1972).
128 33 U.S.C.A. $ 1311(b) (1)(C) (Supp. 1973). Section 303(d), 33 U.S.C.A.
$ 1313(d) (Supp. 1973), requires states to identify those waters for which effluent require-
ments set under {§ 301(b)(I)(A), (B), 33 U.S.C.A. $§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (B) (Supp.
1973), are not sufficiently stringent.
120 33 U.S.C.A. 1311(c) (Supp. 1973). This provision applies only to point sources
for which an application is filed after July 1, 1977. Id.
180 33 U.S.C.A.	 1313(d) (Supp. 1973).
181 33 U.S.C.A. 13I2(a) (Supp. 1973).
182 33 U.S.C.A.	 1313(c)(2) (Supp. 1973).
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the section 302 standards do not refer to the definite standards of sec-
tion 303, uniformly applicable to a given body of water, but indicate
that determination of the relationship of effluent standards to water
quality will be determined for individual facilities on an ad hoc basis.
The definite standards of section 303 apply only to Phase I, while the
vague criteria of section 302 are the only standards for the upward
revision of effluent limitations standards in Phase II. This difference
represents a step backward to the vague and unworkable standards
of the pre-1965 law, and it should be avoided.
While a two-phase transition is imposed upon existing point
sources, section 306 requires that all new point sources 1" in certain
specified industrial categories must meet effluent limitations based on
the "best available demonstrated control technology • . . including
where practicable . . . no discharge of pollutants."'" Section 306 recog-
nizes that a delay in the implementation of available technology is not
easily justified when the economic cost of implementing such technol-
ogy can be included in the initial cost of the point source. To vitiate
the competitive disadvantage which section 306 places upon the
operator of a new point source 1" any new point source which meets
"best available technology" standar s when constructed is exempt from
the imposition of any more stringent effluent limitations for the lesser
of ten years or the depreciation period of the facility.'"
Both the Senate and the House versions of the 1972 Amendments
included "modification" of existing facilities within the definition of
"new source," 1" but the provision was deleted by the Conference Com-
mittee.'" It is submitted that this deletion of "modification" from
section 306(a) (2), rather than eliminating a superfluous provision, has
instead increased the stringency of effluent limitations applicable to
modified facilities. Had section 306 been applicable to facilities modified
in the first few years following passage of the 1972 Amendments, they
would be required to meet effluent limitations based on the best avail-
able control techniques available at the time of the modification, and
Ian "New source" is defined as "any source, the construction of which is com-
menced after the publication of proposed regulations prescribing a standard of perfor-
mance under . . . [33 U.S.C.A § 1316 (Supp. 1973)] which will be applicable to such
source .. . ." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1316(a)(2) (Supp. 1973).
184 33 U.S.C.A. § 1316(a)(1) (Supp. 1973).
188 The competitive disadvantage to the operator of a new point source is derived
from the shifting of his marginal cost curve upward because of the greater expenditure
vis-a-vis a competitor utilizing an existing point source, who need not immediately
utilize "best available technology." However, when the existing point source operator
must employ "best available technology" in 1983 and the new point source operator can
continue to utilize his original equipment because of the exemption, this competitive dis-
advantage will shift if 1983 "best available technology" is more expensive than the
"best available technology" was at the time of installation by the new point source.
18° 33 U.S.C.A. § 1316(d) (Supp. 1973).
187 S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 306(a)(2) (1971); H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 306(a) (2) (1971).
188 5, Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 127 [hereinafter cited as Conference
Report].
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would not be subject to any more stringent limitations for ten years.
Such techniques would not necessarily be the equal of best practicable
techniques in 1977 or be as efficient as "best available control technol-
ogy" available in 1983. Since, however, this same criticism can be
leveled against the ten-year grace period that Congress did allow for
new sources, it is clear that an economic trade-off was made. It was
felt that businessmen cannot be expected to make the heavy capital in-
vestment necessary for the most advanced control technology in the
face of constantly changing standards.'"
Another set of effluent limitations has been created for toxic mate-
rials,"° inasmuch as Congress concluded that there was a special need
to assure that effluent limitations on these pollutants were effectuated
quickly."' The Administrator of the EPA is directed by section 307
of the 1972 Amendments to promulgate effluent standards for toxicants
within nine months of passage of the Act (by July, 1973), 142 which
standards are to take effect no later than one year after promulgation.'
The final set of federal effluent standards to be developed under
the 1972 Amendments are those applicable to industrial users of public
treatment works. Any industrial operation discharging into a public
treatment works need not meet the general effluent limitations applicable
to the operation's industrial class, but must instead meet "pretreatment
standards" for "those pollutants which are determined not to be sus-
ceptible to treatment by [public] treatment works or which would
interfere with the operation of such treatment works."'
The use of effluent limitations to control water pollution has not
escaped criticism. Critics have argued that effluent limitations are
vulnerable to a "technology gap" and hence would become obsolete as
the level of available technology increases the ability to abate pollu-
tion.145 This contention is not without merit, but any potential "tech-
nology gap" can be avoided by providing for periodic revision of
effluent limitations to keep them commensurate with current technol-
139 Statement of William Ruckelshaus, 3 BNA Env, Rep., Current Devs. 679 (Oct.
13, 1972).
149 33 U.S.C.A. 1 1317(a) (Supp. 1973).
141 Senate Report, supra note 119, at 60-61; see also statement of Donald Hilden,
Toxicologists Division of Water Quality Research, FWQA, 1 BNA Env. Rep., Current
Devs. 384-85 (Aug. 7, 1970).
142 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317(a) (1), (2) (Supp. 1973).
148 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317(a) (6) (Supp. 1973).
144 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317(b)(1) (Supp. 1973). Section 307(c), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317(c)
(Supp. 1973), requires pretreatment standards for new point sources to be separately
promulgated at the same time that the "national standards of performance" are promul-
gated. Since pretreatment standards relate directly to the quality of the discharge and the
capability of the public treatment works, this section appears to be superfluous in that,
technologically, there is no reason to impose more rigid pretreatment standards on new
point sources than are imposed on existing point sources.
145
 Hearings on S. 75, S. 192, S. 280, S. 281, S. 523, S. 573, S. 601, S. 679, S. 927,
S. 1011, S. 1012, S. 1013, S. 1014, S. 1015, and S. 1017 Before the Subcomm. on Air
and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 554
(1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings].
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ogy. The 1972 Amendments require that all effluent limitations estab-
lished pursuant to section 301 (b) (2) be reviewed at least every five
years.' ° The special consideration given toxic pollutants is also re-
flected by a three-year periodic review for such effluent limitations.'"
The review requirements are less specific for other cases: pretreatment
standards'48 and standards for "new sources""° are to be revised from
time to time, but a statutorily fixed frequency has not been established.
Moreover, as noted earlier, effluent limitations established for a partic-
ular new source pursuant to section 306 are exempt from revision for
the lesser of ten years or the depreciation period of the pollution con-
trol equipment."' At the end of that initial period the effluent limita-
tions applicable to the point source will be revised to conform to the
standards applicable under section 301(b) (1). While the ten-year
exemption of section 306(d) may be justified in some cases during
Phase I, it is unjustified after the implementation of Phase II inasmuch
as industries constructing new facilities will no longer be able to claim
competitive disadvantage because the same requirement—best avail-
able technology—will apply to all point sources.
The 1972 Amendments failed to incorporate anti-degradation
standards into the regulatory scheme, 15 ' a measure that had been
strongly recommended by environmentalists. The primary argument
in favor of anti-degradation provisions is that polluters should not be
allowed to pollute "clean" waters simply because the applicable water
quality standards are lower than the present quality of the water. Ad-
vocates of anti-degradation provisions argue that absent these provi-
sions, industry, , rather than abate, will continuously seek out new clean
streams.1" In turn, industry is a strong and vocal critic of proposals
for anti-degradation standards, arguing that it is impossible to conduct
any kind of construction or industrial production without some degra-
dation, and that such activity would be stifled by strong anti-degrada-
tion provisions.'"
Although the proponents of anti-degradation provisions make out
a persuasive argument, it is submitted that as a matter of logic anti-
degradation standards are alien to a system of effluent limitations.
Strict enforcement of the former demands an immediate halt to all
water pollution, while the latter recognizes that all water pollution
cannot be halted by legislative fiat; the reduction and eventual elim-
140 33 U.S.C.A. 11311(d) (Supp. 1973).
147 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317(a)(3) (Supp. 1973).
148 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317(b)(2) (Supp. 1973).
149 33 U.S.C.A. § 1316(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1973).
150 33 U.S.C.A. § 1316(d) (Supp. 1973).
151 Section 402(h) of both bills, S. 2770 and H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
provided for non-degradation requirements. This provision was deleted by the Con-
ference Committee without any explanation. Conference Report, supra note 138, at 140.
152 Barry, supra note 101, at 1122.
158 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 145, at 755-56, 1071-75, 1116. ,
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ination of water pollution is dependent upon the state of available tech-
nology.164
The 1972 Amendments do not, as noted above, include anti-degra-
dation provisions; however, if the EPA finds that anti-degradation
provisions would be desirable, it would appear that such requirements
could be imposed by the promulgation of administrative regulations.
Despite a lack of statutory anti-degradation requirements under the
1970 Act, federal guidelines for state water quality standards under
that law included anti-degradation standards.'
B. Enforcement Procedures
An effective water quality control system cannot depend primarily
on voluntary compliance because such compliance imposes substantial
economic burdens on many industries. While owners and operators of
point sources cannot be expected to flaunt anti-pollution laws com-
pletely, without effective enforcement provisions adequate compliance
will be illusory. Effective enforcement involves three elements: the
regulation of discharges through a permit system, provisions to deter
violations of the permit system regulations, and abatement actions to
stop pollution where the deterrent element has not been sufficiently
effective. These three elements have been incorporated by the 1972
Amendments.
1. Preventive Enforcement: Regulation Through the Permit System
a. Prior Law.—One of the major deficiencies of the 1970 Act, as
noted above, was the lack of effective means to prevent the discharge of
pollutants. Section 102 of the 1970 Amendments to the FWPCA had
added a state certification requirement when an applicant for a federal
permit planned to discharge any pollutants into navigable waters.'
Section 102 did not, however, institute a new comprehensive federal
pollutant discharge permit program; it merely required that cognizance
be taken of state water quality standards where permits were required
for reasons other than general water quality.
The failure of Congress to enact a statutory permit program for
the regulation of the discharge of pollutants prompted the President to
154 See Senate Report, supra note 119, at 42.
155
 Federal guidelines for approval of state water quality standards under the
FWPCA (1970) required that state standards include anti-degradation provisions. 1967
Senate Hearings, supra note 107, at 659. The 1970 Act made no reference to such re-
quirements.
166 Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, $ 102, 84 Stat.
91, 108 (codified at 33 U.S.C. $ 1171(b) (1970)). Neither the House nor Conference
Reports allude to any interaction of this Act with the Refuse Act. H.R. Rep. No. 127,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). It would
appear that the Act was intended to require certification for those activities for which
federal permits were required and generally issued under other statutory provisions or
regulations. The Army Corps of Engineers permit program was not in operation at the
time of enactment.
696
THE WATER POLLUTION AMENDMENTS OF 1972
direct the Army Corps of Engineers, in December of 1970, 1" to estab-
lish a permit program under the Refuse Act of 1899. 1" Regulations
governing the issuance of permits were adopted in July of 1971, 16° and
under those regulations all discharges to which the Refuse Act was
applicable were declared to be unlawful.' 0° For the purpose of the per-
mit program, the Refuse Act was considered applicable to all discharges
into navigable waterways,'" with some exceptions.'" The regulations
authorized permits to be issued for the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters or tributaries thereof.' Moreover, the Secretary of
the Army, when issuing a permit, was required to accept the findings
of the Administrator of the EPA regarding certification under section
21 of the 1970 Act.'
The use of the Refuse Act as a basis for a comprehensive permit
program was severely limited.'" Not only were discharges from mu-
nicipal sewage treatment plants beyond the purview of the Refuse
Act,106 but permits could be issued only for discharges into navigable
waters although the prohibition on discharges extended to the tribu-
taries of navigable waters.'"
The death knell of the Refuse Act permit program was sounded
in Kalur v. Resor.168 The Kalur court held that the Army Corps of
Engineers, in compliance with the National Environmental Policy
Act,'" was required to issue an environmental impact statement with
each permit. As a result of this decision the Corps of Engineers declared
a moratorium on the issuance of permits until the regulations could be
changed to meet the requirements imposed by Kalur decision 170 Thus
1 " Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. 986 (1970).
158 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
100 33 C.F.R. § 209.131 (1972).
100 Id. at § 209.131(d)(4) (1972).
101 Id. at § 209.131(d)(1).
102 Id. at * 209.131(d)(2).
1°8 Id. at § 209.131(a).
104 Exec. Order No. 11,574, * 2(a)(2) (A), 3 C.F.R. 986-87 (1970); 33 C.F.R.
209.131(d)(8)-(11) (1972). Further conditions which would prohibit the issuance of a
permit were detailed in 33 C.F.R. 4 209.131(d)(11) (1972).
106 See text at note 31 supra.
100 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970); 33 C.F.R. § 209.131(d)(2)(ii) (1972).
101' 33 U.S.C. * 407 (1970); Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971). Even
before the Kalur decision, the Refuse Act was insufficient to control water pollution. The
regulations exempted discharges into non-navigable tributaries from state certification.
33 C.F.R. § 209.131(h)(3) (1972).
1°8 335 F. Supp.	 (D.D.C. 1971).
100
 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq. (1970). Section 2 of NEPA requires that all agencies of
the federal government "include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—(i) the en-
vironmental impact of the proposed action . . . "42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(1) (1970).
170 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 1088 (Jan. 7, 1972). The situation was further
complicated by the Third Circuit Court • of Appeals in United States v. Pennsylvania
Industrial Chem. Corp., 461 F.2c1 468 (1972), where the court reversed a conviction for
discharging pollutants where the discharge occurred before the permit system was insti-
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the discharge of pollutants continued, without certification and licens-
ing, as if the permit program had never been instituted.
b. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Under
the 1972 Amendments.—Title IV of the 1972 Amendments establishes
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).
Drawing on the Refuse Act permit program and proposals for strictly
state-regulated permit programs,171 the 1972 Amendments establish
a permit system with shared federal and state responsibilities. The
essential concept of the NPDES is the same as that underlying the
Refuse Act program, but the NPDES has remedied the deficiencies of
the Refuse Act permit program and provided a new statutory frame-
work. Administered by the EPA, the NPDES is national in scope, al-
though provision has been made for the suspension of the federal
program whenever a state program is approved by the EPA.'" The
1972 Amendments, however, do not compel the states to institute their
own permit programs; 178 the EPA will issue permits for those states
choosing not to conduct their own permit programs.
The 1972 Amendments should remedy the grave weaknesses of
the Refuse Act permit program. First, conflicts between state and
federal permit programs, which existed under prior 'awl" have been
eliminated. Moreover, permits are now required for municipal sewage
discharges, which were not covered under the Refuse Act.'" Nor does
the Kalur decision, restricting the issuance of permits to a less ex-
tensive category of waters than the category to which the prohibition
on discharges applies,"" limit the NPDES permit system. The scope
of the permit system under the 1972 Amendments is coextensive with
the scope of the prohibition on discharges,'" and should be extended
to virtually all waters within the United States.'" Further, the terms
tuted. The court found that the Refuse Act was a comprehensive scheme that was de-
signed to regulate water pollution, and as such, the absolute prohibition on discharges
was not in fact absolute but required a permit system. The court went on to say: "Con-
gress did not, however, intend criminal penalties for people who failed to comply with
a nonexistant regulatory program." Id. at 475. This case raised the issue of whether
prosecutions for discharges without a permit could continue in light of the moratorium
on issuance of permits following the Kalur decision. See Letter from John Quarles, Jr.,
to Kent Frizzell, Assistant Attorney General, 3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 184
(June 16, 1972).
171
 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 145, at 459, 596.
172
 33 U.S.CA. § 1342(c)(1) (Supp. 1973).
178
 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b) (Supp. 1973).
174 See 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 207-09 (June 25, 1971); id. at 431 (Aug.
13, 1971); see also 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 145, at 1067.
176 33 U.S.C.A. H 1311(a), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), (Supp. 1973). The term "dis-
charge of pollutant" is defined as "(A) any addition of any pollutant to the navigable
waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the
contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other
floating craft." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(12) (Supp. 1973).
176 See text at notes 33-34 supra.
irr 33 U.S.CA. § 1342(a) (Supp. 1973). Section 403 provides for special con-
sideration for ocean dumping. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (Supp. 1973).
178 See text at note 39 supra.
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of the permit, which under prior law were based on water quality
standards, are now based on specific effluent limitations.' This, too,
should make the permit system established by the 1972 Amendments
more effective.
The final limitation on the Refuse Act permit program which has
been remedied by the NPDES is the requirement, imposed by Kalur,
that a NEPA statement be issued with each permit. Under section
511(c) (1) of the 1972 Amendments, NEPA statements will be re-
quired with NPDES permits only for new point sources as defined in
section 306 of the 1972 Amendments. 18° It should be added that there
is some question whether section 511(c) (1) of the 1972 Amendments
is in fact a general exemption from the requirements of NEPA or
applies only to the environmental impact statement requirements of
NEPA."' The basis of the argument for the limited exception was that
the language describing the actions to which section 511(c) (1) 182
 is
directed, "major Federal action[s] significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment," appears only in section 102 (2) (c) of
NEPA,'" which requires environmental impact statements. The legis-
lative history of the 1972 Amendments however, could be interpreted
to indicate that the proper interpretation of section 511(c) is to exempt
the 1972 Amendments from all NEPA requirements, with the excep-
tion of those specific situations set out in the 1972 Amendments.'"
Under the NPDES, all point sources discharging pollutants into
170 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(a) (3) (Supp. 1973).
180 33 U.S.C.A.	 1371(c)(1). (Supp. 1973). Also subject to NEPA requirements
are federal grants for the construction of public treatment works. Id.
1 st 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
182 33 U.S.C.A. 1371(c)(1) (Supp. 1973); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
183
 118 Cong. Rec. H10271 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
184 In both the House and Senate versions of the bill the language of the exemp-
tion in § 511 provided that NEPA requirements regarding water quality standards
would be met by certification under 9 401 and the issuance of a permit under 402.
H.R. 11896 and S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 511(d) (1971). The present language of
§ 511(c), which corresponds to 511(d) of H.R. 11896 and S. 2170, was substituted in
Conference. Conference Report, supra note 138, at 149. The Conference Committee
intended the wording to exempt the Act from NEPA: "If the actions of the Administra-
tor under this Act were subject to the requirements of NEPA, administration of the
Act would be greatly impeded." Id. It is possible that the argument is academic. The
impact statements are the only NEPA requirement which would change the manner in
which an environmental agency considered matters, and for such agencies the require-
ment would appear a mere formality. The congressional record shows that the purpose of
NEPA was to assure that federal agencies take environmental factors into account in
decision making, and this is the very purpose of the EPA in the administration of water
pollution control legislation. 118 Cong. Rec. S16885-86 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (remarks
of Sen. Muskie). But see id. at H10271 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972) (remarks of Rep.
Dingell). Section 511(c)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. 1371(c) (2) (Supp. 1973), is intended to
overcome the decision In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.D.C. 1971), in so far as it requires any other licensing agency to review water
quality standards or effluent limitations set by the EPA. It does not affect such agencies'
obligation to consider other environmental matters, 118 Cong. Rec. H9127 (daily ed.
Oct. 4, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Dingell). .
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"navigable waters" are required to have a permit.'" As has been noted
above, the definition of "navigable waters" in the 1972 Amendments
is broader than under prior law, but remains open to judicial interpre-
tation as to its constitutional limitations. Permits are not required of
sources discharging into publicly owned treatment works.'" All permit
applications filed under the Refuse Act permit program are deemed
applications under NPDES, 187 and permits issued under the Refuse
Act will remain in force for their term.' Permits will not remain in
force if, when originally issued, certification was not required; in those
cases the permits shall extend no later than April 3, 1973.'" Point
sources not included in the Refuse Act program must apply for a
NPDES permit by April 16, 1973,1" and after June 16, 1973, all
applicants must submit an application at least 180 days in advance of
the date on which the discharge is scheduled to begin."' This time
period should be sufficient to allow for the required public notice'
and for any public hearing which may be necessary.'"
Before an application for a NPDES permit can be processed, a
state certification that the discharge will meet the effluent limitations
of sections 301, 302, 306, and 307 must be supplied by the applicant.'
While permits will not be issued if certification is denied, the state
must act within one year or the certification requirement is waived.'"
The state certification must specify the applicable effluent limitations
under sections 301, 302, 306 or 307, and any monitoring requirements
necessary
 to implement those limitations." The EPA must also con-
185
 33 U.S.C.A. 0 1311(a) (Supp. 1973).
189 38 Fed. Reg. 1362 (1973) (proposed regulations for National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System, to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 0 125).
187
 38 Fed. Reg. 1362, 1364 (1973).
182
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (a) (4) (Supp. 1973).
189
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341(a)(7) (Supp. 1973).
190 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(k) (Supp. 1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 1362, 1364 (1973). Such
point sources may continue to discharge pollutants without penalty if any application
for a permit is Med. Until Dec. 31, 1974, for point sources subject to the Act which
have not yet filed for or received a permit, a discharge shall not violate §§ 301, 306, or
402 if they apply for a permit by that date. 33 U.S.CA. 1342(k) (Supp. 1973). This
does not exempt them from § 407 toxic material effluent limitations.
121 38 Fed. Reg. 1362, 1364 (1973).
192 Id. at 1367-68.
108 Id. at 1368-69. The Regional Administrator may deny an "affected person" a
hearing only when the procedural requirements of the subsection are not met. The
regulations are unclear whether this allows for a determination of whether or not a per-
son actually is an "affected person" as defined at 38 Fed. Reg. 1368 (1973), but if that
power is not included demands for public hearings could be had from anyone. Any
party may present oral statements at the hearing and any person may offer written
statements. Id. at 1369. Administrative appeals are limited. Id. Judicial review may be
had "by any interested person" in Ahe appropriate circuit court of appeals if the appli-
cation is filed within 90 days of the final decision entered by the EPA. Id.
194 33 U.S.C.A.	 1341(a)(1) (Supp. 1973). The states are directed to establish
procedures for public hearings in regard to certifications. Id.
199 Id. Although the statutory limit is one year, the EPA will generally regard
three months as a reasonable period before waiver. 38 Fed. Reg. 1362, 1365 (1973).
196 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341(d) (Supp. 1973). This section provides that any state stan-
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sider several other factors which may prohibit the issuance of a per-
mit.'"
Additional restrictions are placed on the issuance of a permit for
discharges which could affect the waters of a state other than the state
in which the discharge originates. The EPA must notify the state whose
waters could be affected and provide an opportunity for a public hear-
ing at which the affected state may propose additional conditions that
it deems necessary to maintain its own water quality standards.'" The
Administrator of the EPA may impose such additional permit condi-
tions as are necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act. If the
imposition of additional conditions cannot assure compliance with all
applicable water quality standards, a permit may not be issued, 19°
Furthermore, no permit may be issued that is in conflict with "area-
wide" waste treatment plans.2"
The primary elements of a NPDES permit are (1) effluent limita-
tions, (2) schedules of compliance, and (3) monitoring requirements.
Each permit must specify the average and maximum daily effluent
discharge quantitatively permitted."' Where the permittee cannot at
the date of issuance meet applicable effluent limitations, the schedule of
compliance sets out specific interim goals of effluent limitations upon
which the permit is conditioned.'" Where the schedule of compliance
covers a period of more than nine months, interim goals must be set at
least every nine months,'" but compliance schedules shall not extend be-
yond July 1, 1977." 4
 By this time all point sources existing as of October
18, 1972, must have achieved effluent limitations based on "best prac-
ticable technology."'"
The key to the success of the permit program is the system of
monitoring requirements.'" The operator of any source under a
dards more stringent than applicable federal standards, will be a part of any federal
permit. See also S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Report].
107 38 Fed. Reg. 1362, 1366 (1973).
109 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341(a) (2) (Supp. 1973).
19° 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341(a)(2) (Supp. 1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 1362, 1366 (1973).
200 33 U.S.C.A. § 1288(e) (Supp. 1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 1362, 1366 (1973).
201
 38 Fed, Reg. 1362, 1367-68 (1973). Where, pursuant to 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(d)
(Supp. 1973), a state has identified those waters for which the § 301(a) (1) (B), 33
U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (1)(b) (Supp. 1973), effluent standards are not stringent enough,
that state must establish a maximum daily load (quantitative measure of effluent) for
those effluents capable of such measurement as determined by the Administrator pur-
suant to § 304(a)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(a)(2) (Supp. 1973). 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(d)
(1)(C) (Supp. 1973). In setting the average and maximum load as required by the
regulations, the state must necessarily take such standards into account for any source
discharging into the designated waters.
202 38 Fed. Reg. 1362, 1366 (1973).
208 Id.
204 Id.
205 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b) (1) (8) (Supp. 1973).
200 It has been suggested that these record-keeping and disclosure requirements
may present Fifth Amendment self-incrimination difficulties. Comment, Federal Water
Pollution Legislation: Current Proposals to Achieve More Effective Enforcement, 13
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NPDES permit is required to (1) install, use and maintain monitoring
equipment, (2) sample effluents at such intervals as the EPA pre-
scribes, (3) maintain records, and (4) file reports with the EPA.2"
Furthermore, the Administrator has the right to sample effluents and
inspect the required records.-" These provisions are substantial im-
provements upon prior law, under which the Administrator of the EPA
could not compel polluters to provide reports and data until substantial
administrative steps to secure abatement had already been taken 2 00
Under prior law a polluter could withhold any information which
would divulge trade secrets,'" but under the 1972 Amendments such
information must be provided to the Administrator, and he must hold
confidential any information which might disclose trade secrets.'"
2. Remedial Enforcement: Criminal Sanctions and Abatement Pro-
ceedings
When a point source fails to secure a permit or fails to follow the
required permit conditions and limitations, remedial enforcement pro-
cedures are provided by the 1972 Amendments. Two types of remedial
enforcement are provided: criminal sanctions, which are intended to
deter operators of point sources from violating the effluent limitations;
and abatement proceedings, which include both injunctive and admin-
istrative relief.
a. Prior Law: Remedial Enforcement Under the 1970 Act and
the Refuse Act of 1899.—Under prior law, the proper enforcement
procedure to be utilized was determined by the character of the waters
affected (e.g., navigable, interstate, or intrastate) and the nature of
the standard which had been violated. As a consequence of the result-
ing wide variety of procedures, the available enforcement provisions
were often vague and uncoordinated.
The primary enforcement provisions of the 1970 Act provided for
the abatement of pollutants discharged into interstate or navigable
waters.2 " The lengthy and impractical procedure required to secure
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 749, 777 (1972). Given the nature of the legislation, however,
this possibility seems remote. The privilege does not include records required to be
routinely kept in order to provide adequate information to enforce restrictions on ac-
tions legitimately subject to government regulation. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S.
1, 32-33 (1948). Nor may the privilege be claimed by a corporation, of which these
records will often be required, except where overbreadth is alleged. Oklahoma Press Pub.
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946). The diligence of the operators of point
sources in fulfilling these monitoring requirements is encouraged by the threat of
criminal sanctions for falsifying reports or rendering inaccurate any monitoring device.
See 33 U.S.C.A. 1319(c)(2) (Supp. 1973). Any person convicted is liable for a
$10,000 fine or imprisonment for not more than six months or both. Id.
20I 33 U.S.C.A.	 1318(a) (4) (B) (i) (Supp. 1973). The specific monitoring require-
ments are set out at 37 Fed. Reg. 1362, 1367 (1973).
208 33 U.S.C.A. § 1318(a)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1973).
210 Id.
U.S.C. § 1160(f)(2) (1970).0 d 
211 33 U.S.C.A. § 1318(b) (Supp. 1973).
212 33 U.S.C. { 1160(a) (1970).
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abatement, however, rendered the provision largely ineffective. Initially
a conference of state and interstate agencies concerned with water
pollution was to be called by the Administrator of the EPA whenever
(1) it was requested by state or local governing bodies of a state
affected by pollution originating in another state, (2) it was requested
by the local governing bodies of the state in which the discharge
originated, (3) the Administrator of the EPA had reason to believe that
the discharge of pollutants into navigable or interstate waters was
endangering the health and welfare of persons in states other than the
origin of the discharge, (4) the production of marketable shellfish in
interstate commerce was impaired,21° or (5) whenever the Adminis-
trator had reason to believe that the pollution of interstate or navi-
gable waters was endangering the health or welfare of persons in other
countries. 214
 The alleged polluter would be given an opportunity to
present his views to the conference."'
Following the conference the Administrator would recommend
appropriate action to the state water pollution control agency.'" If
after six months the state agency had failed to act on the recommenda-
tions, the Administrator could order a public hearing, 217 at which all
parties would have an opportunity to present their views. The Hear-
ing Board would determine what measures were necessary to abate any
pollution and recommend to the Administrator that such measures be
taken.'" The findings would be forwarded to the polluter and the
state water pollution control agency along with a notice of the dead-
line, a reasonable time not to exceed six months, for abatement." ) If
action had not been taken on the recommendations within the specified
time and the pollution endangered the health or welfare of persons in
a state other than the origin of the discharge, the Administrator could
request the Attorney General of the United States to bring an action
for abatement.22° If the pollution endangered the health or welfare
only of persons within the state of origin, the consent of the governor
was necessary before the federal government could bring an abatement
act ion .221
Unfortunately, these procedures often proved to be cumbersome,
inefficient, and ineffective.222 Although the federal government could
215 33 U.S.C. § 1160(d) (1) (1970). The applicable definition of "interstate waters"
was "all rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow across or form a part of State boun-
daries, including coastal waters." 33 U.S.C. 1 1173(e) (1970).
214 33 U.S.C. § 1160(d)(2) (1970).
215 33 U.S.C. 9 1160(d)(3) (1970).
210 33 U.S.C. § 1160(e) (1970).
217 33 U.S.C. § 1160(f)(1) ( 1970).
215 Id.
211) Id.
225 33 U.S.C.	 1160(g)(1) (1970).
221 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g) (2) (1970).
222 In over twenty years only one case ever reached the litigation stage. It took
four years from the intial conference until a consent decree was entered. The case in-
volved a midwestern city dumping sewage into a river. The city constructed a treat-
703
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
act to abate the pollution of interstate waters, it was often very diffi-
cult to do so because state governments were afforded the first op-
portunity to secure abatement. The power of the federal government
was even more circumscribed where the pollution was totally intra-
state. If a state failed to abate a pollutant discharge, which frequently
occurred because of pressure from industry,'" notification by the Ad-
ministrator of recommended action would not often result in state
action. Nor would there be a strong possibility of the state consenting
to an action by the federal government to secure abatement.
Although this procedure continued to be available, the 1965
Amendments to the existing water pollution control law offered a
streamlined alternative abatement procedure 2 2' Section 10(c) (5) of
the pre-1972 law provided for abatement actions by the Administrator
of the EPA, subject to 180 days' notice, where the discharge of pollu-
tants into any interstate waters or tributaries thereof reduced the
quality of the interstate waters below applicable water quality stan-
dards?' This section failed, however, to bring within its scope the
discharge of pollutants into navigable intrastate waters, or into tribu-
taries of interstate waters when the discharge into such tributaries
did not produce the required degree of degradation of interstate waters.
While the abatement procedures of section 10(c) (5) were not insig-
nificant, they were insufficient because the scope of the section was not
extended to all bodies of water.
A further inadequacy of the section 10(c) (5) abatement proce-
dure resulted from a failure of the section to free federal proceedings
from the constraint of state government consent. The Administrator
could act independently only when the interstate water quality stan-
dards for interstate waters of a state other than the state of origin of
the discharge were violated?" If the water quality standards were
violated for interstate waters within the state of origin, the permission
of the governor was still necessary?"
Other enforcement problems were inherent in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act prior to the 1972 Amendments. Under prior
law, abatement procedures did not provide any incentive for polluters
to abate pollutant discharges voluntarily. There was no threat that
ment plant, but only half of the input was being treated two years later. Five million
tons of raw sewage were being discharged into the river every day—after action to
secure abatement had been taken. Senate Report, supra note 196, at 5.
223 See Hearings on S. 75, S. 192, S. 280, S. 281, S. 523, S. 573, S. 601, S. 679,
S. 927, S. 1011, S. 1012, S. 1013, S. 1014, S. 1015, and S. 1017 Before the Subcomm. on
Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
612 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings]; 118 Cong. Rec. H2528 (daily
ed. March 27, 1972) (statement of Wendell R. Anderson, Governor of Minnesota, in-
serted by Rep. Dingell).
224 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903, 1 5(a), amending 33 U.S.C. § 466 (1964)
(codified and renumbered at 33 U.S.C. 1160(c) (1970)).
223 33 U.S.C.	 1160(c)(5) (1970) .
226 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(5) (1970); 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g) (1) (1970).
221 33 U.S.C.	 1160(c)(5) (1970); 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g)(2) (1970).
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punitive sanctions would be imposed; there was merely the possibility
that at some time in the future the polluter would be subject to an
abatement order. This gap in the enforcement provisions of the 1970
Act was partially remedied by the application of the Refuse Act
sanctions.228 The statutory sanctions for each violation of the Refuse
Act, however, were limited to a fine of not less than $500 or more
than $2,500 or imprisonment for not less than 30 days or more than a
year, or both 228
Although criminal penalties and injunctive relief 230
 were avail-
able under the Refuse Act for any discharges into navigable waters,
the Government's actual use of these remedies was limited, Prosecu-
torial decisions were to be made by the District Engineer of the Army
Corps of Engineers and the Regional Representative of the EPA."'
Furthermore, action was to be taken only for most serious violations. 282
As an enforcement tool then, the Refuse Act was makeshift at best238
and was often a totally ineffective system.
b. Federal Enforcement Under the .1972 Amendments.—The
1972 Amendments provide for totally revised enforcement proce-
dures.234
 Moreover, the same regulatory provisions apply to all waters.
Finally, the cumbersome administrative procedures that "would serve
no purpose except delay" 238 have been replaced by "streamlined legal
procedures.""°
Under the new procedures, the enforcement power of the federal
and state governments is concurrent. The EPA may defer to a state
government with an approved permit program for prosecution of viola-
tions of permit conditions, but if state action is not instituted within
thirty days, the federal government is required to act to secure abate-
ment.'" It is expected, however, that the states will be the primary
enforcement authority except where there is no state permit program
228 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 413 (1970).
222
 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
280 United States v. Florida Power & Light Co., 311 F. Supp. 1391 (S.D. Fla.
1970). For a more extensive discussion of the judicial interpretation of the Refuse Act,
see Note, The Refuse Act: Its Role Within the Scheme of Federal Water Quality Legis-
lation, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 304, 311-14 (1971).
231 Draft Guidelines for Litigation Under the Refuse Act Permit Program, 1 BNA
Env. Rep., Current Devs. 1099 (Feb. 4, 1971).
232 EPA Guidelines on Water Pollution Enforcement, 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current
Devs. 562 (Sept. 10, 1971); see also Statement of Russel Train, id. at 97 (May 28, 1971)
(there would be no effort to prosecute other than serious violations).
233 Statement of John Quarles, Jr., 3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 271 (June
30, 1971). The most obvious inadequacy of the Refuse Act is that under it no action,
either civil or criminal, could be brought against a municipal sewage treatment plant.
239 The
 general enforcement procedures do not apply to discharges from vessels
into waters of the contiguous zone. Compare 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (Supp. 1973) with 33
U.S.C.A. § 1362(6), (12)(B) (Supp. 1973).
288 Senate Report, supra note 196, at 64.
230 Statement of John Quarles, Jr., to ABA National Institute, 3 BNA Env. Rep.,
Current Devs. 793, 794 (Oct. 26, 1972).
287 33 U.S.C.A.	 1319(a)(1) (Supp: 1973).
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in effect,'" in which case the federal government will act as the sole
enforcement authority.'" Federal deference to state authority does
not extend to violations based on discharges without a permit as op-
posed to violations of permit conditions.'"
When the EPA has exclusive authority or chooses not to defer
to state authority, the commencement of procedures to secure abate-
ment is not in the Administrator's discretion. Whenever, in those in-
stances, the Administrator discovers a violation, he must either issue
a compliance order or commence a civil action. 241 If he issues a com-
pliance order, the order must be personally served on the alleged vio-
lator and must state with specificity the nature of the violation and the
period for compliance, which is not to exceed thirty days.242 If the
person to whom the compliance order is directed fails to comply within
the specified time, the Administrator may institute a civil action.'"
Environmentalists have criticized giving the Administrator the
discretionary power to refrain from instituting a civil action for an
injunction when a compliance order is not obeyed.'" This criticism may
not be entirely warranted, however, because the existence of such
discretion will not necessarily ease the threat of litigation to a recalci-
trant polluter. Should he choose to ignore a compliance order, he not
only faces the risk of injunction but may also be liable for a civil
penalty of $10,000 per day for as long as he defies the order.'" It is
238
 Senate Report, supra note 196, at 64.
230 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a)(3) (Supp. 1973). The federal government is also the
sole enforcement authority during periods of "federally assumed enforcement." 33
U.S.C.A. § 1319(a) (2) (Supp. 1973),
240 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a)(1) (Supp. 1973).
241
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a) (3) (Supp. 1973). Whenever, on the basis of any informa-
tion available to him, the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of
§§ 301, 302, 306, 307, or 308 of the Act or is in violation of any permit conditions or
limitations in a permit issued under { 402 by the EPA or a state, he must issue an order
requiring compliance with the applicable sections or requirements, or bring a civil action
under § 309(b). It would appear that judicial review of compliance orders is required.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 704 (1970).
Although the above procedure may initially appear to provide undesirable red tape,
it will probably aid the EPA in enforcing the Act. On review, the EPA would merely have
to show that its finding was supported by the evidence, while in an action for abatement
a heavier burden of proof would be required. Furthermore, the person to whom the order
was issued would be interested in prompt review so as to halt the accrual of any civil
penalty which could later be assessed against him for the continued violation of a valid
compliance order.
242
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a)(4) (Supp. 1973). If however, the violation pertains to
monitoring requirements, the compliance order will not take effect until the person to
whom it was issued has had an opportunity to confer with the Administrator of the EPA.
Id.
243 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(b) (Supp. 1973).
244 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 223, at 603, 609-10.
245 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(d) (Supp. 1973). An amendment was offered in the House
to include the willful or negligent violation of a compliance order among the actions which
can be criminally prosecuted. The amendment was opposed on the grounds that § 309(c)
(1) already provided penalties for those acts which would be in defiance of a compliance
order. It was also argued that such a position would cause undue hardship to a person who
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hoped that the fear that a substantial liability will accrue under this
provision will encourage voluntary compliance once an order has been
issued. In fact, the discretionary nature of the Administrator's power
may actually have positive benefits. The EPA will be relieved of a
heavy case load that often could be resolved through negotiation. This,
in turn, will free the resources of the EPA for litigation against the
most serious offenders.
Although the 1972 Amendments do not provide for any confer-
ences or advisory hearing procedures, such provisions could constitute
useful tools for inducing acquiescence to compliance orders. Such
procedures, however, should not be required before every action is
commenced. As noted above, cumbersome administrative procedures
crippled the enforcement provisions of prior water pollution control
laws."' The Administrator of the EPA, therefore, should be able to
go directly to the courts in those cases that he feels would be best
resolved through the judicial process.
The availability of only post-discharge abatement procedures does
not provide a satisfactory incentive for the voluntary abatement of
pollutant discharges; such incentive can arise only from the existence
of fines and civil penalties for violations of the water pollution laws.
The maximum $2,500 fine under the Refuse Act,' generally ineffec-
tive as a deterrent to large industrial facilities, has been replaced by a
fine of not less than $2,500 or more than $25,000 per day for the willful
or negligent violation of any applicable effluent standards or monitor-
ing requirements. 2" In addition, any person convicted, a category that
includes a responsible corporate officer, 24° may be imprisoned for as
long as one year.2 ° For a second conviction the penalties are increased
to a maximum of $50,000 per day or imprisonment of up to two years,
or both.' Any violation which is not willful or negligent is subject
to a civil penalty of $10,000 per day.262
The NPDES and the penalties imposed for violations of its re-
quirements constitute, it is submitted, an effective statutory frame-
work for water pollution abatement. The fines that may be imposed
for failure to comply with applicable effluent limitations will now, in
many cases, be greater than the cost of abatement. However, the fines
and civil penalties established by the 1972 Amendments must be
diligently enforced in order to provide the economic incentive to abate
pollution:
The key to an effective regulatory system is that there be
violated an arbitrarily issued compliance order. The amendment was defeated. 118 Cong.
Rec. 112616-17 (daily ed. March 28, 1972).
249 See text following note 212 supra.
247 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
249 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c) (1) (Supp. 1973).
249 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c) (3) (Supp. 1973).
250 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c) (1) (Supp. 1973).
251 id.
252 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(d) (Supp. 1973).
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firm, specific requirements imposed on all parties with an
evenhanded fairness. The exact requirements must be clearly
understood and publicized. They must also be uniformly and
strictly enforced.253
Although it is reasonable to expect the courts to utilize the fine
penalties strictly, judges may be reluctant to imprison persons respon-
sible for pollutant discharges, and may impose only monetary sanc-
tions. It is submitted, then, that consideration should be given to
increasing the amounts of fines and civil penalties and formally elimi-
nating the imprisonment sanctions of the 1972 Amendments; indeed,
it is possible that the imprisonment sanctions should be removed re-
gardless of whether they are used or not. Monetary sanctions are more
appropriate for violations because they may be accurately evaluated
in economic terms, and when set at a level above the cost of abate-
ment will be likely to induce rational businessmen to control pollutant
discharges voluntarily.
Further economic incentive for the voluntary control of pollutant
discharges appears in the provision in section 508 of the 1972 Amend-
ments forbidding any federal agency from entering into a procurement
contract with any industrial facility that has been convicted under
section 309(c) for violations of provisions of the 1972 Amendments. 2"
While this sanction is of limited application—it is effective only after
conviction for a violation—it may prove to be a substantial induce-
ment to those corporations relying on government contracts for much
of their business. 255
 However, violations by facilities already holding
government procurement contracts are not covered by section 508 of
the 1972 Amendments. It would not be unreasonable to suspend gov-
ernment contracts where the contractors have violated the 1972
Amendments and have not made good-faith efforts to remedy the
violations.
It is submitted that the regulations to be promulgated under sec-
tion 508 should require that all government contracts contain a com-
pliance provision as a condition to the Government's continued obliga-
tion under the contract.' It has been suggested that some businesses
will attempt to circumvent the procurement sanctions of the Act by
258 Statement of John Quarles, Jr., to ABA National Institute, 3 BNA Env. Rep.,
Current Devs. 793 (Nov. 3, 1972) (emphasis added).
254 33 U.S.C.A. § 1368(a) (Supp. 1973). This form of sanction is not original to the
1972 Amendments. A similar provision is in the Clean Air Act of 1970. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-
4(a) (1970).
255 Industry representatives advocated sanctions limited to the suspension of any
government contract to any facility which knowingly violated applicable standards. Hear-
ings on S. 3687, S. 3468, S. 3470, S. 3471, S. 3472, S. 3181, S. 3484, S. 3500, S. 3507, S. 3614,
S. 3688, and S. 3697 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 584 (1970).
256 See Exec. Order 11,602, § 4 (June 29, 1971), 3 C.F.R. 167-68 (1971), issued
pursuant to the procurement section of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-4(c) (1970),
which instituted a similar procurement provision.
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transferring the performance required by a contract from a violating
facility to a facility not in violation of the 1972 Amendments. If such
an evasion of the law is attempted, both facilities should be prohibited
from procuring any federal contracts until they have both complied.2"7
C. Citizen Suits
The availability of private actions to secure abatement was ex-
tremely limited under prior water pollution control laws. Under the
Refuse Act of 1899 a citizen supplying information leading to a convic-
tion could receive one half of any fine collected.258 Several attempts
were made under the Refuse Act to bring qui tam actions against pol-
luters, but the actions were dismissed for lack of plaintiffs' standing to
sue?" The only other actions available were traditional common law
actions in tort, and public and private nuisance actions 2 00
In response to the argument advanced by environmentalists that
t is only with the public acting as a watch dog that the law will be
fully enforced,"" Congress included in the 1972 Amendments a pro-
vision for citizen suits to abate violations 2°2 The provision was modeled
on a similar provision in the Clean Air Act of 1970. 208  opposition
was expressed to such a provision on the grounds that sufficient private
remedies already existed. 264 Moreover, opponents of private actions
predicted that allowance of citizen suits would result in a multiplicity
of actions and crowded court calendars. 265 Advocates of citizen suits,
on the other hand, responded that frivolous actions would not be
brought because environmental actions are generally complex and
costly 266
The Senate version of the 1972 Amendments included strong pro-
visions for citizen participation in the enforcement process.' Under
that bill "any person" could commence an action against any person
alleged to be in violation of applicable effluent standards or an order to
comply with effluent standards, 208 or against the Administrator of the
2" S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1971).
258 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
2" See Mitchell v. Tenneco Chem., Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1031 (D.S.C. 1971) ; Bass
Angler Sportsmen Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ala. 1971).
See generally Note, The Refuse Act: Its Role Within the Scheme of Federal Water
Quality Legislation, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 304, 342-51 (1971).
"a Sec generally Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis. L. Rev.
738.
281 Hearings on Water Pollution Control Legislation Before the House Comm. on
Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 858 (1971).
282 33	 § 1365 (Supp. 1973).
260 42 U.S.C.	 1857h-2 (1970).
264 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 223, at 755.
202 Id. at 694-95, 701. As a deterrent to frivolous suits the 1972 Amendments allow
attorney's fees to be assessed against either party. 33 U.S.C.A. 4 1365(d) (Supp. 1973).
See Senate Report, supra note 257, at 81.
200 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 223, at 721.
2" 5. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 0 503 (1971).
268 Id., f 505(a)(1).
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EPA for failure to perform a non-discretionary duty. 2" However, no
action could be commenced if the proper authorities had begun and
were diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action." Moreover, sixty
days' notice to the alleged violator, to the state in which the alleged
discharge occurred and to the Administrator of the EPA was required
before an action could be commenced.271
 After sixty days' notice, an
action could be brought against the Administrator for failure to per-
form a non-discretionary duty, except for actions alleging failure to
prosecute violations of sections 301, 302, 306, 307 and 309 of the Act
or the violation of permit conditions, in which case the notice require-
ment was waived.' The stated purpose of these notice provisions was
to encourage agency enforcement and minimize the number of citizen
suits that would reach the litigation stage."
The final version of the Act reflects amendments by the House"
and is considerably more limited than the Senate bill. It allows "any
citizen" to bring an action on the same conditions provided in the Sen-
ate version; 275
 however, "citizen" is defined as "a person or persons
having an interest which may be adversely affected." 2" This restrictive
definition of standing, added by the Conference Committee," is in-
tended to reflect the decision in Sierra Club v. Morton.278 This limita-
tion on standing, which means that the citizen suit provisions are
weaker than those of the Clean Air Act, has been attacked by environ-
mentalists." Advocates of the more limited standing provisions, on
the other hand, respond that this provision "is not an unreasonable
diminution of the right to sue . . . [because] [c]onservation groups
269 Id., § 505(a)(2).
270 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(b) (1)(B) (Supp. 1973); S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess, § 505
(b)(1)(B) (1971).
271 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1973); S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 505(b)(1)(A) (1971).
272 S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 505(b)(2) (1971).
273 S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report].
274 H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 505 (1971); see S. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 145-46 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Conference Report].
273 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) (Supp. 1973).
276 33 U.S.C.A, § 1365(g) (Supp. 1973). H.R. 11896, § 505(g), reprinted in 118
Cong. Rec. 11.2796 (daily ed. March 29, 1972), defined "citizen" considerably more
narrowly, limiting the definition to citizens of the geographic region having a direct
interest which may be affected or any group of persons who had been active in the
administrative process,
277 Conference Report, supra note 274, at 146.
278 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In Sierra Club, the Court held that a party, to have stand-
ing to seek review of an administrative order, must show "that he is himself adversely
affected . ." Id. at 740.
279 See 3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 563 (Sept. 22, 1972).
The Clean Air Act allows "any person," subject to notice requirements, to com-
mence a suit to enforce the provisions of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a), "Person" is
defined by the Act to include "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State,
municipality, and political subdivision of a State." 42 U.S.C. § 1857h(e) (1970). On its
face the statute does not restrict standing to "affected persons."
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should experience no difficulty in finding a qualified local citizen to
bring suit."2"
The final version of the 1972 Amendments is also more restrictive
than the Senate bill concerning actions brought against the Adminis-
trator of the EPA. Whereas the Senate bill waived the sixty days'
notice requirement for violations of most sections of the Act, the final
version provides for waiver of the sixty days' notice requirement, al-
lowing actions to be brought immediately after notice, only where
the failure of the Administrator to prosecute violations of the effluent
limitations in sections 306 or 307(a) is alleged 281 There would seem to
be no great reason, however, to distinguish between section 301 and
302 effluent limitation violations on the one hand and section 306 and
307(a) effluent limitation violations on the other. Accordingly, it is
submitted that in neither case should the citizen be permitted to bring
an immediate suit. The Administrator should be given the first oppor-
tunity to take action against the offending polluter. No unreasonable
burden seems to be placed upon the plaintiff by requiring sixty days'
notice; if within sixty days the Administrator performs the duties he
was alleged to have neglected, the need for commencing an action is
obviated. Under present provisions, however, where allegations are
based on sections 306 or 307(a), an action may be commenced where
merely giving notice to the Administrator could bring about the desired
result.
IV. STATE LIMITATIONS ON THE DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS
UNDER THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
Although both the 1970 Act and the 1972 Amendments declare
that the states are primarily responsible for the control of water pollu-
tion, the two acts differ in one major respect. The earlier law failed to
delineate for the states the measures required to control water pollution.
The 1972 Amendments provide for state enforcement of water pollu-
tion laws and set forth a detailed framework of state laws and regula-
tions which must be promulgated to control water pollution, but if any
state fails to act to control pollution, the federal government retains the
power to act.
A. Standards
The water quality standards of the 1970 Act are retained and
expanded in the 1972 Amendments. Under the 1970 Act quantitative
state water quality standards were required only for interstate waters,282
and the only requirement imposed on state water quality standards was
that they be set at a level which would protect the public health and
280 118 Cong. Rec. U2739 (daily ed. March 29, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Gubser).
281 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(3)(2) (Supp. 1973).
282 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(1) (1970).
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welfare and generally serve the purposes of water pollution control.'"
If a state failed to act or submitted for approval standards which were
not approved, and then failed to remedy the deficiencies, the Admin-
istrator could promulgate standards for the state.'" Water quality
standards for intrastate waters were not required, and any standards
for intrastate waters independently adopted by a state were not subject
to EPA approval.
The water quality standards imposed by the 19 72 Amendments
are the same as those of the 1970 Act. The 1972 Amendments provide
that state water quality standards for interstate waters previously
adopted will remain in effect where they meet the requirements of the
1970 Act.'" If a state does not make the changes necessary to meet
those requirements, the Administrator of the EPA will promulgate
for the state such standards as are necessary."' Any water quality stan-
dards for intrastate waters which had been promulgated by states
before the 1972 Amendments will remain in force where consistent with
the "public health and welfare" requirement which the 1970 Act had
imposed only with respect to interstate waterways.' Previously, intra-
state water quality standards were not required to conform to the
FWPCA; now, in contrast, the procedures for approval by the Admin-
istrator of intrastate water quality standards are identical to those for
interstate water quality standards.'" Moreover, every state that did
not previously have intrastate water quality standards must promulgate
such standards and have them approved by the Administrator.'"
Unlike the 1970 Act, which had no mandatory periodic review of
water quality standards, the 1972 Amendments require each state to
hold public hearings for review and revision of water quality standards
283 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (3) (1970).
284 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(2) (1970).
285 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(a)(1) (Supp. 1973).
288 Id. The procedure to be followed by the Administrator in promulgating water
quality standards applicable to a state is set out in § 303(b)(1) of the Act, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1313(b)(1) (Supp. 1973). The Administrator is directed to "promptly" prepare and
publish proposed regulations for any state which fails to submit proposed standards or
submits inadequate standards. Such regulations will take effect within 180 days of publica-
tion unless within that time the state complies with the requirements set by the Adminis-
trator. Id.
Although by 1971 47 states had adopted water quality standards for interstate
waters (Hearings on S. 75, S. 192, S. 280, S. 281, S. 525, S. 573, S. 601, S. 679, S. 927, S.
1011, S. 1012, S. 1013, S. 1014, S. 1015, and S. 1017 Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. On Public Works 92 Cong., 1st Sess. 1448 (1971)
thereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings]), only 27 had obtained EPA approval of
such standards. Senate Report, supra note 273, at 4.
287 33 U.S.CA. § 1313(a)(2) (Supp. 1973).
280 Id; see note 286 supra.
280 33 U.S.CA. § 1313(a)(3) (Supp. 1973). Each state must have submitted
standards by April 16, 1973. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(a) (3) (A) (Supp. 1973). The Adminis-
trator must notify the state of any necessary changes within 90 days of submission of the
standards, and if the state does not promulgate standards in accordance with the Ad-
ministrator's changes within 90 days, the Administrator will promulgate the applicable
standards. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(a)(3)(C) (Supp. 1973).
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at least every three years."' Each such revision is subject to approval
by the Administrator of the EPA."' The states are directed to set
standards which protect the public health and welfare and enhance the
quality of the water. Among the factors to be considered in setting
water quality standards are the effect on public water supplies and
the use of the water for recreational, agricultural, wildlife and in-
dustrial use?" Environmentalists contend that pollution cannot be
abated if water quality standards provide for "industrial use."'" Such
problems can be remedied, however, by designating as multi-use
waters those waters used for industrial purposes, and thus requiring
the application of higher effluent standards than a strictly industrial
use designation would entail.
To halt the further degradation of bodies of water already very
seriously polluted and to effect their eventual rehabilitation, the states
are required to designate those bodies of water within the state for
which the generally applicable effluent limitations are not stringent
enough to implement the applicable water quality standards."' For
such designated waters, the states must promulgate supplementary
rules setting the quantitative maximum daily cumulative amount of
pollutants that may be discharged into the waters."' These limitations
upon maximum discharges must include a safety margin to account
for the inadequate state of knowledge of the relationship between
effluents and water quality?" As with other state standards, the
cumulative maximum discharge standards are subject to approval by
the EPA?"
Any state, whether or not it chooses to conduct its own permit
program under section 401, 2" must promulgate effluent standards at
least as stringent as those required by sections 301(b) (1), 302(b) (2),
306 and 307, or as stringent as are necessary to meet any applicable
water quality standards?" Any state-promulgated effluent limitations
will apply to permits issued by the EPA in the event that a state
chooses not to conduct its own permit program?" Thus, local expertise
is taken into account in determining the needs for water pollution
control."'
290 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(c)(1) (Supp. 1973).
291 33 U.S.CA. 1313(c)(3) (Supp. 1973).
202 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(c)(2) (Supp. 1973).
298 1971 senate }flaring, supra note 286, at 608.
294 33 U.S.C.A. 1313(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1973).
290 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (Supp. 1973).
298 Id.
297 33 U.S.C.A. 1313(d)(2) (Supp. 1973).
298 See text at note 355 infra.
299 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(e)(3)(A) (Supp. 1973). The Administrator is directed by
304(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(b) (Supp. 1973), to publish guidelines for setting effluent
limitations.
809 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341(d) (Supp. 1973).
801
 The promulgation of uniform federal effluent limitations was opposed by many
on the ground that such standards would not take Into account local expertise. 1971
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As noted above, effluent limitations must be periodically revised
or their efficacy will be seriously impaired. Although revision pro-
cedures for state effluent limitations are required by the 1972 Amend-
ments, no minimum frequency of revision is required.'" It is therefore
submitted that the Administrator should not approve any state planning
procedure which does not require that effluent limitations be reviewed
at least as frequently as federal effluent limitations.
B. Enforcement Procedures
Under the 1970 Act and the Refuse Act of 1899, jurisdiction over
the permit program and enforcement of pollution control laws was
vested solely in the federal government and was not coordinated with
existing state permit and enforcement programs."' This system of
uncoordinated concurrent control of water pollution control was severely
criticized by state governments and the sources subject to regulation.'"
The 1972 Amendments integrate state permit programs with the
federal scheme for water pollution control. Although the states are
not required to conduct their own permit programs, they may do so
if the state program meets the statutory requirements and regulatory
guidelines; in such instances the Administrator will suspend operation
of the federal permit system in that state.'"
The threshold requirement for federal approval of a state permit
program is the existence of a state statute which prohibits the dis-
charge of pollutants by any person except as authorized by permit.'"
The essential requirements for the administration of a state permit
program can be broken down into four groups: administrative pro-
cedures, permit conditions, monitoring requirements, and enforcement
proceedings. While administration of a state permit system is a state
function, the EPA retains a veto power over the issuance of particular
permit. The state water pollution control agency is required to forward
a copy of any permit application to the Regional Administrator of the
Senate Hearings, supra note 286, at 736, 753-54. It would appear, however, that these
proponents desired to see less stringent standards set by the states.
802 33 U.S.CA. § 1313(e)(3)(D) (Supp. 1973).
sos The Pennsylvania State Water Pollution Control Association in August 1971
called for the Army Corps of Engineers Permit Program to be dropped in that state
because it was a duplication of state effort, 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 431 (Aug.
13, 1971). The difficulties engendered by such duplication were recognized, and in 1972
the EPA began to develop state-federal cooperative programs under which a state could
issue its own permits; such permits would be required to meet the requirements of the
federal regulations in force at the time. 3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 345 (July 21,
1972); id. at 503 (Sept. 1, 1972).
a" 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 286, at 1064, 1067, 1448-79; 2 BNA Env.
Rep., Current Devs. 207 (June 25, 1971); id. at 431 (Aug. 13, 1971).
3435 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(c)(1) (Supp. 1973). The statutory requirements are set out
in §§ 402 (b)(1)-(9), 33 U.S.CA. :1 1342(b)( 1 )-(9) (Supp. 1973). Section 402(c)(2),
33 U.S.C.A. I 1342(c)(2) (Supp. 1973), requires state compliance with guidelines issued
pursuant to § 304(h)(2), 33 U.S.CA § 1314 (h) (2) (Supp. 1973).
800 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28392 (1972) (all citations to 37 Fed. Reg. 28390-402 are
final regulations which will be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 124).
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EPA"' and to notify any other state potentially affected by the dis-
charge." Before any permit may be issued, the state water pollution
control board must give public notice' and provide opportunity for
a public hearing.'" The EPA may veto the issuance of any permit if
the state agency has failed to comply with requests by any potentially
affected state that additional conditions be imposed, 31' or if the EPA
finds that the permit is "outside the guidelines and requirements of
[the Actl."312
The scope of the EPA's veto power over state-issued permits has
evoked considerable controversy. Opponents of the veto power argued
that it was a needless duplication of effort and that it infringed upon
the states' power to administer their own programs!" Advocates of
the veto power supported the measure as a check on the possibility
that industry may exert undue influence at the state level." The
Senate version of the bill, with a strong federal veto provision, was
adopted over the House version,'" which had weaker veto provisions.'"
The existence of strong veto provisions does not necessarily indicate
that the Administrator will review every permit issued by state water
pollution control agencies. The review and veto power should be
judiciously exercised and reserved for permits of major importance."'
Furthermore, under the broad waiver provisions in the 1972 Amend-
ments, the Administrator may waive his right of review with respect
to any particular permit.'" More importantly, EPA review can be
waived for entire classes or categories of permits in one state with
an approved program when it is found that the state is particularly
807 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d) (1) (Supp. 1973) ; 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28393 (1972).
8o8 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1342(b)(3), (4) (Supp. 1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28394 (1972).
The other state in which water quality is affected must be given an opportunity to sub-
mit written recommendations of conditions of the permit to the state water pollution
control agency issuing the certification. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b) (5) (Supp. 1973); 37 Fed.
Reg. 38390, 28394 (1972).
300 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b) (3) (Supp. 1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 38390, 28394 (1972).
310 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d)(3) (Supp. 1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28395 (1972). A
public hearing may be requested by any applicant, affected governmental body or agency,
or any interested persons. If there is sufficient public interest a hearing must be held.
"Instances of doubt should be resolved in favor of holding the hearing." Id.
811 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d) (2)(A) (Supp. 1973).
812 308 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 1973).
313 See Statement of William Ruckelshaus, 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 966, 968
(Dec. 10, 1971).
814 See Letter from Don Lufkin, Commissioner, Conn, Dep't of Environmental
Protection, to Rep. Blatnik, 118 Cong. Rec. 112757-58 (daily ed. March 29, 1972).
818 H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 402(d)(2) (1971), provided for EPA veto
only when the objections of another state in which water quality standards were affected
by discharges in the permitting state were not acted upon by the permitting state.
318 Conference Report, supra note 274, at 138-40..
317 S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report].
818 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d)(3) (Supp. 1973). There is no waiver permitted for a
permit issued for ocean dumping. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1343(b) (Supp. 1973).
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capable of administering its own program,'" or for all permits in
certain classes in all states with approved permit programs."'
Any permit issued under a state program must require compliance
with all applicable effluent limitations' and monitoring require-
ments.'" All permits must specify in quantitative terms the average
and maximum daily discharge allowed.'" The permits must also con-
tain compliance schedules for cases where discharges do not meet appli-
cable effluent limitations at the time of issuance, and such schedules must
require that interim goals be met at least every nine months where
the period of the schedule exceeds that time.'" Permits can be issued
for any term of up to five years," and must be subject to revocation
or modification for any violation of their terms or conditions, for
misrepresentation or fraud, or because of any change in circumstances
that would require the permit to be modified."'"
Before any state program will be approved, the state must have
adequate monitoring provisions consistent with the monitoring pro-
visions of section 308." Permits issued by a state water pollution
control agency must insure that the permittee comply with the self-
monitoring provisions of section 308 828
 and that the state agency have
a right of entry similar to that of the EPA.'"
The fourth requirement for approval of a state permit program
is adoption of adequate enforcement provisions.'" A state water pollu-
tion control agency must have the power to:
(1) issue compliance orders."
(2) bring actions for injunctive relief to abate continuing
violations."
(3) criminally prosecute violations."'
(4) bring actions to collect civil penalties.'"
(5) exercise emergency powers to eliminate pollution which
presents an immediate danger to health or welfare."
819 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(e) (Supp. 1973).
920 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(f) (Supp. 1973). This section Is intended to allow states to
issue permits for small discharges, such as those from small municipal treatment works,
without review by the EPA. Senate Report, supra note 317, at 71.
321 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b)(1) (A) (Supp. 1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28396 (1972).
822 33 U.S.C.A. 1342(13)(2) (Supp. 1973).
823 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28396 (1972).
824 Id .
825 33 U.S.C.A.	 1342(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28397 (1972).
826 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b)(1)(C) (Supp. 1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28397 (1972).
327 33 U.S.CA. § 1342(b) (2) (B) (Supp. 1973); see also 33 U.S.C.A. § 1318(c)
(Supp. 1973).
328 33 U.S.CA. 1342(b) (2) (A) (Supp. 1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28398 (1972).
829 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28397 (1972).
nao 33 U.S.CA. * 1342(b)(7) (Supp. 1973).
331 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28399 (1972).
832 Id.
333 Id.
884 Id.
835 Id. This section requires that states have emergency powers similar to those
granted to the EPA in § 505 of the Act. 33 U.S.CA. 1364 (Supp. 1973).
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The fines and civil penalties for violations are required either to be
"comparable" to those applicable in federal actions or to "represent
an actual and substantial economic deterrent . . . ." 3" The latter
alternative has interesting potential. A substantial economic deterrent
to a small-scale local industry might not constitute such a deterrent
to a larger industry. One proposal, suggested at the Senate Hearings
but not adopted, would have required that instead of a mandatory
maximum fine, a minimum fine plus an additional amount based on
the financial capacity of the violater be imposed 887 The additional
amount could be a percentage of the facility's gross revenue, profits,
or capital investment. This proposal is one example of the different
possible methods that the states can develop of providing economic
deterrents to the discharge of pollutants.
V. THE STATE-FEDERAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES
AND POWER
Under prior law, state water pollution control efforts were largely
independent of federal pollution control programs. Duplication and
wasted effort resulted from the insufficient coordination between state
and federal controls. 888
 Sources of pollutant discharges found com-
pliance with both state and federal water pollution control laws dif-
ficult because the two were not sufficiently interrelated."'
These difficulties presented Congress with a crucial problem during
the enactment of the 1972 Amendments: the determination of the
respective roles that the federal and state governments would take in
the promulgation and enforcement of water pollution and control
standards. Advocates of state primacy argued that state governments
are better able to respond to particular local problems. 84° On the other
hand, proponents of federal primacy contended that national uniformity
was an essential prerequisite of an effective program to eliminate water
pollution 841
The 1972 Amendments broaden the scope of federal authority and
more clearly define the relationship between the federal and state
governments in controlling water pollution. The Act declares that
"[i] t is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, reduce,
888 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28399 (1972).
887 Hearings on S. 75, S. 192, S. 280, S. 281, S. 523, S. 573, S. 601, S. 679, S. 927,
S. 1011, S. 1012, S. 1013, S. 1014, S. 1015, and S. 1017 Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 731 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings].
888 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 207 (June 25, 1971); Id. at 431 (Aug. 13,
1971) .
880
 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 337, at 1064, 1067, 1477; 2 BNA Env. Rep.,
Current Devs. 207 (June 25, 1971) ; id. at 431 (Aug. 13, 1971).
840 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 337, at 736.
341 Id. at 1064.
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and eliminate pollution . . . ."342
 Notwithstanding this declaration;
the control scheme developed in the 1972 Amendments places primary
responsibility on the federal government. The state governments will
assume responsibility for the control of water pollution only after the
EPA has approved the state program as meeting minimum federal
requirements.
The official promulgation of water quality standards and effluent
limitations is a matter of state responsibility under the continuing
planning process which each state is required to have approved by the
EPA 843
 Although guidelines for determining water quality standards
are generally as vague as under prior law,8 4 effluent limitations are
required to meet minimum federal standards. 345 The system, in effect,
combines the virtues of national uniformity and local independence.
Advocates of uniform national standards feared that industry influence
on the local level would cause states to set standards lower than those
required to protect water quality,346 and noted that the fear that in-
dustry would move from a state where standards had been raised would
deter states from setting high standards.' Proponents of state-promul-
gated standards argued that water quality varies from state to state and
that these factors must be considered in the promulgation of effluent
standards 898 It was further argued that because of "political reasons"
the federal government would set standards lower than are necessary to
effectively eliminate water pollution.m°
It would appear that the separation of powers envisioned by the
1972 Amendments will be more attractive to advocates of national
uniformity than to proponents of local autonomy. The minimum effluent
limitation standards promulgated under section 301 will apply to all
point sources discharging pollutants into a body of water even if lesser
standards would not impair the maintainance of the water quality.
On the other hand, where a state determines that the minimum effluent
standards are not sufficient to insure compliance with state water quality
standards, the state is free to set more stringent effluent limitations.
Where the federal minimum effluent limitations are not stringent
enough to maintain the quality of a specific body of water, the state
842 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(b) (Supp. 1973).
843 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(e) (1), (3)(A) (Supp. 1973).
344 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(3) (1970) and 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(0(2) (Supp.
1973).
848 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(e)(3)(A) (Supp. 1973). Minimum effluent standards will be
promulgated by the Administrator under §§ 301(b)(1)-(2), 306-07, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311
(b)(1)-(2), 1316-17 (Supp. 1973).
a40 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 337, at 612; see 118 Cong. Rec. H2528 (daily
ed. March 27, 1972) (statement of Gov. Wendell R. Anderson, Governor of Minnesota,
inserted by Rep. Dingell).
847 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 337, at 612.
848 Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68
Mich. L. Rev. 1103, 1123 (1970); 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 337, at 385, 736.
848 1971 Senate Headings, supra note 337, at 1081.
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must set more stringent limitations for point sources discharging into
such waters.35° Ideally, the federal minimum standards will act as a
check on states that would have set insufficient effluent limitations
but for federal standards. The power of the states to set more stringent
limitations enables them to avoid suffering harmful environmental
effects from any federal standards which are set too low.
Adoption of federal minimum effluent limitations does help to
alleviate fears that the imposition of more stringent standards by a
state will encourage an industrial exodus. Such actions by industries
will be discouraged by the provisions of the 1972 Amendments re-
quiring special effluent limitations to be applied to newly constructed
point sources."' For example, any presently existing point source is
subject to the minimum effluent limitations based on "best practicable
technology,'" but any new point sources must meet more stringent
minimum effluent standards based on "best available technology. ina
Thus, in addition to bearing relocation costs, an industrial facility
moving to a new location and hence becoming a new point source must
install more costly control equipment 864 -
In contrast to the setting of standards, which is immediately
delegated to the states, the enforcement of effluent limitations is pri-
marily alloted to the federal government until such time as any state
has developed a state permit and enforcement program which meets
the statutory standards of the 1972 Amendments."' As noted above,
the states are not compelled to administer their own permit programs"'
even though the intent of Congress is that the states should assume
the primary responsibility for administering the permit programs,""
and speculation has arisen that a surprising number of states will choose
not to do so in light of the expense of running such a program."' For
states choosing not to conduct a state permit program, the EPA will
continue to issue permits and conduct enforcement procedures." 60
Any state desiring to administer a permit program may submit
a program description to the Administrator of the EPA. The Adminis-
trator shall approve any permit program which meets federal guide-
lines,'" after which time the federal permit program in that state
850 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(d) (Supp. 1973).
851 it must be noted that factors other than the cost of compliance with local water
pollution control legislation will be considered by a business in considering whether to
relocate. See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 337, at 1088.
852 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (b) (1) (Supp. 1973).
868
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1316(a)(1) (Supp. 1973).
864 Sec 118 Cong. Rec. H2493 (daily ed. March 27, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Clausen).
864 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).
856 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b) (Supp. 1973).
867 Senate Report, supra note 317, at 71.
858 3 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs. 1020-21 (Jan. 5, 1971).
859 See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1319, 1342(a)-(b) (Supp. 1973).
858
 33 U.S.C.A. § 11342(b) (Supp. 1973). The minimum requirements for a state
permit program are set forth in § 402(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b) (Supp. 1973), and 37
Fed. Reg. 28390-402 (1972).
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shall be suspended.'" As noted above, even after the federal permit
program has been suspended for a particular state, the EPA retains
the power to review and veto the issuance of any permit by the
state,'" although it is expected that this power of review will be
judiciously exercised."'"
Until a state permit program is approved, only federal enforce-
ment procedures will be in effect, and there is no statutory provision
for suspension of the federal enforcement program when the state
permit program is approved. The federal enforcement power is in-
tended, however, to be judiciously exercised in such circumstances and
reserved for cases of national importance:
The Committee again, however, notes that the authority of
the Federal Government should be used judiciously by the
Administrator in those cases deserve [sic] Federal action
because of their national character, scope or seriousness. The
Committee intends the great volume of enforcement action
be brought by the State. It is clear that the Administrator is
not to establish an enforcement bureaucracy but rather to
reserve his authority for the cases of paramount interest.'"
It is anticipated that the majority of enforcement actions will be
brought by state pollution control agencies.'" If states fail to act, the
EPA will enforce water pollution controls.'" Whenever an approved
state permit program is in effect, the Administrator may report any
violation of a permit condition or limitation to state authorities for
action rather than act himself. If, however, the state fails to act, the
Administrator must initiate the appropriate administrative proceedings
or bring a civil action."'
Under the Senate version of the Act, the EPA would have de-
ferred to state enforcement authority only for violations of the effluent
limitations in sections 301 and 302.368 Only the federal government
was empowered to act for violations of national standards of perform-
ance (section 306), toxic effluent limitations (section 307), and moni-
toring violations (section 308). 8" The scope of federal deference to
state enforcement was altered by the House version to cover any vio-
lation of the conditions or limitations in a permit which implemented
861 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(c) (Supp. 1973).
862 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d), (e), (f) (Supp. 1973).
868 Senate Report, supra note 317, at 71.
864 Id. at 64.
868 Id.
886 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a)(1), (2) (Supp. 1973).
867 33 U.S.CA. § 1319(a)(1) (Supp. 1973). The minimum acceptable state enforce-
ment procedures are found in 37 Fed. Reg. 28390, 28398-99 (1972).
868 S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 309(a)(1) (1971).
869 Id. 1 309(a)(3).
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any one of those five sections 340 The House version was adopted by
the Conference Committee.'"
Conspicuously absent from the violations which the Adminis-
trator may in his discretion refer to state authorities is the discharge
of pollutants without a permit 872 It would appear, however, that if
such a violation is independently discovered by state authorities, the
state is not precluded from prosecuting the polluter. There appears to
be no reason why section 301(a), which permits the EPA to defer to
state enforcement, should exclude violations for the discharge of pol-
lutants without a permit; and it is submitted that, in view of the
general policy of the 1972 Amendments these violations should also
be left to the states for enforcement.
Although the administration of permit systems and the enforce-
ment of standards and permit conditions may be delegated to states
by the EPA, federal control does not abruptly cease. Watchdog pro-
visions have been built into the provisions delegating both categories
of powers. Should the Administrator find after a public hearing that a
state is not adequately administering its permit program in accordance
with the requirements of the 1972 Amendments, program approval
may be withdrawn if the state has not acted to correct the asserted
deficiencies within ninety days.'"
One important question which the 1972 Amendments fail to an-
swer concerns the status of permits improperly issued under a permit
system that has lost EPA approval. During consideration of the pas-
sage of the Amendments the Nixon Administration offered a version of
permit program revocation as a substitute for the veto power of
the Administrator, but the proposal was not accepted. The Adminis-
tration's proposal would have provided for federal review of all permits
issued during the ninety-day period immediately preceeding revocation
of approval of a state permit program. 874
 The addition to the 1972
Amendments of similar provisions supplementing, rather than in lieu
of, the EPA veto power may be advisable. Although an additional
opportunity to review state-issued permits would not be necessary for
permits previously reviewed by the EPA, such review may be desirable
for the many permits which, under the broad waiver provisions of the
1972 Amendments,'" could have been issued without any federal
review.
Under the provisions of the 1972 Amendments, no opportunity
is provided, after revocation of a state permit program, for the EPA
870 H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 309(a)(1) (1971).
811 S. Rep. No, 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 131-32 (1972).
872 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a) (Supp. 1973).
878 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(c)(3) (Supp. 1973).
874 Statement of William Ruckelshaus, 2 BNA Env. Rep., Current Devs, 966, 968
(Dec. 10, 1971).
818 33 U.S.C.A. §{ 1342(e), (f) (Supp. 1973).
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to review state-issued permits for which EPA review had been waived.
It is submitted that the EPA should be afforded an opportunity to
review those state permits, issued within ninety days preceding revo-
cation of approval of a state permit program, for which EPA review
had originally been waived.
If a state permit program complies with the requirements of the
1972 Amendments but the state is lax in enforcing it, the Adminis-
trator of the EPA may, upon thirty days' notice, institute a period of
"federally assumed enforcement" for the state."' It is important to
note that no "public hearing" is necessary under this provision. It is
submitted, however, that although a public hearing would cause delay,
it should not be dispensed with. It should also be noted that since the
EPA can sufficiently enforce permit conditions under section 301(a),
there is really no need for this provision; and indeed it could be char-
acterized as punitive inasmuch as any state under "federally assumed
enforcement" is ineligible for any federal grants for a state pollution
control program 8 77 This latter sanction provides an even better reason
for demanding a public hearing before any action is taken by the
EPA to institute "federally assumed enforcement." Indeed, the federal
government may be required to afford a state the opportunity for a
hearing under the principles of Goldberg v. Kelly."'
It is submitted that the sanction of ineligibility for federal grants
for a state planning program should also be extended to the revocation
of approval of a state permit program. The possibility of the impo-
sition of this sanction will not deter states from choosing to administer
their own programs but may very well serve as an incentive to re-
habilitate a program after the Administrator has notified the State
that the permit program does not meet the required Federal standards.
CONCLUSION
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, the FWPCA had been generally ineffective
as a weapon to combat the ever growing problem of water pollution.
If properly administered, however, the 1972 Amendments should
provide an effective weapon for the control of water pollution. Both
the individual weaknesses and the lack of coordination of the compo-
nents of the water pollution control program under prior law have
been remedied in the 1972 Amendments. The program for the con-
struction of treatment works has been expanded, and if the authorized
funds are appropriated many of the present water pollution sources
370
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a)(2) (Supp. 1973).
877 33 U.S.C.A. § 1256(f)(2) (Supp. 1973).
B 78 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg the Supreme Court held that procedural due
process was required in administrative actions to revoke welfare benefits. This requirement
was imposed even though the receipt of welfare benefits is not a right but a matter of
legislative largess. The situation in Goldberg appears to be analogous to that presented by
federal grants to state governments for water pollution control programs.
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could be effectively eliminated. Moreover, the requirements for fed-
eral grants and the operation of federally funded treatment works
have been effectively coordinated with the control standards and
permit program. The failure to effect such coordination was a major
deficiency of prior legislation, and remedying this problem should ease
the difficulty of controlling pollutant discharges from municipal
sewage systems.
The implementation of effluent standards which will be monitered
at the point source should provide an extremely effective permit pro-
gram. For the permit program to be effective, however, the courts
must, in accord with the intent of Congress, apply the broadest pos-
sible definition of "navigable waters." If this term is not given a broad
definition, the coordinated programs of the 1972 Amendments will be
of little value because the scope of the Amendments will be unreason-
ably narrow. As this comment has attempted to demonstrate, the 1972
Amendments have been designed to avoid the pitfalls of prior legis-
lation. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
have instituted definitive standards and streamlined enforcement tech-
niques. The delineation of the respective federal and state roles is not
so clearly defined as some critics would have preferred,'" but the sys-
tem can work effectively if the states are diligent in instituting pro-
grams under the provisions of the Act and the federal government
exercises judicious intervention.
MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR.
8" See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 337, at 384, 548.
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